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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines whether a governmental elite
consensus exists that the nature of public corruption in
the Las Vegas Valley justifies the use of federal law
enforcement undercover operations.

Using the elite

interviewing method, the writer obtained the perceptions
of twenty-four sworn public officials from the cities of
Henderson, Las Vegas and North Las Vegas regarding their
views of public corruption and undercover operations.
The writer contends that in accordance with social
contract theoretical principles, federal undercover
operations are justified if a consensus of seventy-five
percent of the respondents agree to their use.

The

research demonstrated that an ninety-six percent of the
respondents agree such operations should be used to
investigated allegations of public corruption in the Las
Vegas area.
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CHAPTER 1
introduction

This is a study of police undercover operations
(UCOs) within a framework of social contract theory.

It

inquires into the opinions of local governmental elites
regarding the use of such operations in coping with one
specific crime in one specific locality:

public

corruption in the Las Vegas Valley.
I proposed the following hypothesis:

A

governmental elite consensus exists that the nature of
public corruption in the Las Vegas Valley justifies the
use of federal undercover operations.
Defining and Operationalizing
Key Concepts

In this paper, the scope of public official was
limited to officials who swear an oath prior to taking
office.

In general, these are authoritative leaders

charged with making and/or executing public policy which
is enforced by law.
An undercover agent is defined as a police officer
who, in an undercover capacity, infiltrates a group
and/or conspiracy for the purpose of obtaining
information about a crime (i.e. public corruption).
Corruption (of public officials) is that behavior
proscribed by law (e.g. accepting bribes, kickbacks,
1
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extortion, etc.)*

While the scope could easily be

expanded to include any instance where there is an
apparent conflict of interest or where an official uses
his office in some manner for personal (at the expense
of public) gain, not all such cases could be
investigated under criminal law.
Justifying UCOs lies at the heart of this paper.
UCOs are replete with actions that go against
conventional norms of respectable behavior.

These must

be reconciled with other values of our community.

One

way of justifying such operations is to show there is a
consensus in Las Vegas that UCOs should be used in
public corruption matters.
The level of agreement necessary to establish a
consensus I set at seventy-five percent.

A simple

majority did not seem adequate to demonstrate strong
support for undercover work.

Therefore, my hypothesis

withstands falsification if three-fourths of the
respondents agree that federal law enforcement agencies
should be using UCOs to investigate allegations of
public corruption.
Research Design and Method

Inasmuch as political corruption is generally a
consensual crime (where the direct victim is a willing
participant) carried on in secret (as are undercover
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operations) away from the view of potential witnesses,
obtaining empirical data is a problem.

My purpose was

to explore in depth the perceptions of local government
elites currently in office regarding this topic.

At the

same time, I had no ability to manipulate the variables
of my hypothesis.

Accordingly, a nonexperimental

research design best facilitated gathering and analyzing
relevant data.
The most appropriate method for obtaining relevant
data regarding this topic was elite interviewing.

Elite

interviewing did not necessarily preclude quantifying
the data as in a survey questionnaire.

But to have

actually limited my research to a standard questionnaire
would not have provided the kind of in-depth information
I was seeking.
By the term elite in this case, I am referring to
groups of people who by virtue of their position may
possess some special knowledge or expertise regarding
public corruption in the greater Las Vegas area;

and

the impact of undercover operations on the political
process.

In general, I was interested in the opinions

of two groups who have substantial impact on law
enforcement priorities and policy:

sworn elected

office-holders and senior law enforcement officials.
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This is not to say these groups are more familiar
with the topic than say academics, the media, citizen
watchdog organizations or other groups.

However, these

two in particular play a prominent and intertwining role
prior, during and after corruption and undercover
investigations are exposed.

They receive complaints of

corruption and police misbehavior directly from the
citizenry and are charged with doing something about
them.

While other elites or groups may exert some

influence on law enforcement practices and priorities,
it is a reasonable presumption that they do so through
one or more of these two groups.
The sworn elected officials in my research
population included Clark County judges and
commissioners; the mayors and city council members of
Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, and Henderson;
Clark County District Attorney.

and the

Police investigators

included local officials of those cities as well as the
FBI and the State of Nevada; and the U.S. Attorney.
The potential importance of the opinions of the
pool from which I had to draw is significant.

Several

officials had held political posts for more than ten
years.
offices.

Others had plans to seek higher political
Two respondents are planning to run for the

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD)

sheriff's office.

But perhaps most striking, one judge

was only a few votes short of becoming a justice on the
state supreme court.
In order to obtain a diversity of opinion I used a
stratified sampling technique.

I assumed a degree of

homogeneity among elected officials and law enforcement
personnel.

Therefore, fewer interviews were required in

order to obtain sufficient data to make tentative
suggestions and comparisons.

Due to constraints on my

time and resources, I decided that the number of people
I wished to interview was 25.
City councilman, county commissioners and judges
were chosen randomly by lot.

Law enforcement officials

were chosen based on their positions as
supervisors/investigators of public corruption matters.
I allocated six interviews to various levels of law
enforcement agencies to ensure that I received the
broadest, albeit minimal, description of law enforcement
opinion regarding public corruption and UCOs.
interviews were broken down as follows:
U.S. Attorney (1)
Henderson Police Department (1)
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (1)
North Las Vegas Police Department (1)
Nevada state police (1)

The
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (1)
I divided elected officials into four sub-groups:
32 judges (16 district, eight municipal and eight
justices of the peace);

12 city council members;

county commissioners; three mayors;
County District Attorney.

seven

and the Clark

These sub-groups total 54

persons and were randomly sampled according to their
percentage of that figure.

However, North Las Vegas and

Henderson each have only one municipal judge and justice
of the peace.

In the interest of obtaining a sample of

each category from each city, I interviewed a
disproportionate number (one) of each of those two
groups in those cities.

Therefore, the interviews were

allocated as follows:
Judges (10)
District (4)
Municipal (3):

one from each city

Justice of Peace (3):

one from each city

City Council (3)
One from each city
County Commission (2)
Mayor (3)
Clark County District Attorney (1)
Choosing exactly which individuals should be
interviewed depended on two factors:

first, whether
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their numbers came up when my four-year-old daughter
rolled the dice;
for interviewing.

second, whether they were available
Asking a public official to sit down

for a 45-60 minute interview was asking for no small
sacrifice for many of my respondents.
My thesis advisor, Professor Steven Parker,
expressed concern that some judges may decline the
interview because they may one day have to preside over
an undercover public corruption matter in court.

In the

event that a selected official declined to respond, my
intended method of choosing respondents was to randomly
draw names until the required number was met or all were
exhausted.

This proved to be far too time consuming

when it came to selecting district court judges.

I

found myself in a position of waiting two and three days
for a judge's secretary to find out whether the
particular judge was willing and available for an
interview.

Ultimately I called all sixteen and took the

only four available.
I conducted 24 of 25 interviews.
respondents were women.
government surprised me.

Eight of the

The number of women in local
I was under the impression Las

Vegas was characterized by a "good-old-boy network."
Indeed, according to one female respondent, "the goodold-boy network is alive and well and still excludes
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women."

At least two respondents felt this was a

contributing factor to public corruption, particularly
among the judiciary.

But the fact remains that two of

three mayors, three of seven county commissioners and a
number of judges and law enforcement investigators are
women.
Two of the original district judges randomly
selected agreed to the interview.

Others declined

either because they lacked the time, were not interested
in the topic, had nothing to contribute, did not give
interviews or I was unable to reach anyone at their
office at the times I tried to call.
I was not able to interview others I had intended.
The original Las Vegas justice of the peace I had
selected cancelled the interview the day prior to the
date it had been scheduled due to the lack of time.

I

then selected an alternative based on this judge's
suggestion.

The mayor of Las Vegas also had no time to

be interviewed;

however, her secretary advised me that

if I mailed in my questions the mayor would find the
time to dictate answers to them and send them to me.

I

have yet to receive a response.
Although I did talk to the head of the Nevada
Division of Investigation and an investigator for the
state attorney general's office, I was advised that the
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state did not use undercover operations in public
corruption investigations.

Moreover, neither agency had

investigated an allegation of public corruption in
southern Nevada in at least thirteen and five years,
respectively.

They would do so if and only if such

matter had been referred to them from another agency or
direction from higher authority;

not as a result of

citizen complaints or other sources.

Due to the small

number of state investigators, I will reveal neither the
person nor his/her agency for fear of causing him/her
problems in the future.
For reasons unknown to me, I was not able to
interview the U.S. Attorney.

Instead, I was referred to

the an assistant U.S. Attorney knowledgeable about
public corruption matters.
I arranged all but five interviews myself and I am
grateful to those who introduced me or allowed me to use
their names.

In introducing myself, I had to consider

my status as a law enforcement agent and graduate
student as well as the political sensitivity of the
topic.

Professor Mehran Tamadonfar pointed out that if

respondents were aware of my occupation there may be a
reactivity problem to my questions.

My initial

inclination was not to reveal what I did for a living
unless asked.
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However, as was pointed out to me by a colleague,
if I did not disclose my occupation prior to each
interview, the officials later may find out anyway.
Some would undoubtedly question my motivations and even
officially protest to my employers, the university or
the press.

I could well find myself the topic a news

story entitled "Lawman Masquerades as Student in
Corruption Probe."

The thought gave me nightmares.

Also in the back of my mind was the knowledge that more
than one law enforcement officer thought this was a
perfect undercover role to gain information.

While I

disagree strongly, if these individuals could think so,
then so could others in the media and elsewhere.
On the other hand, my status as a law enforcement
officer could probably have opened doors with any
respondent if I revealed it at the time I requested the
interview.

This idea made me uncomfortable for at least

two reasons.

First, I didn't think it would be

appropriate;

second, it probably would have made the

respondents feel I was on official business.
Therefore, when I telephoned my request for an
interview, I introduced myself (usually to a secretary)
as a graduate student of political science at UNLV
working on a master's thesis.

This helped ensure that I

did not have access to public officials which any other
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graduate student would not ordinarily have.

In most

cases I was not even asked to describe the nature of the
topic.

Only with law enforcement officials did I

discuss in detail who I was and what I was doing;

I did

so because my name may have been familiar to them and I
wanted to ensure they knew the interviews were not
intended for official business.
At the beginning of each interview, I described the
nature of the topic and went over definitions.

I also

revealed my occupation and made certain the respondents
were aware I was not on official business;

my project

was intended solely for academic purposes and was not
sponsored by the agency for which I worked.
In general the respondents were forthright and
willing to help me with my project.
generous with their time.

All were very

The average interview lasted

about 56 minutes.
The interviews were all friendly and took place in
the respondents' public/business offices during normal
working hours.

This meant I had to arrange my schedule

accordingly and use quite a bit of vacation time.

The

write-ups took about as long as the interviews
themselves.
I would like to say that my occupation did not
prejudice the answers, but I am not certain that would
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be an accurate statement.

As I left one interviewee's

office (who had known my occupation before the
interview), I overheard him telling someone "When the
government calls, make yourself available."

I was also

concerned when a couple respondents said such things as
"I support the police."
At other times, I felt a few of the respondents may
have been a little guarded.

One official asked for a

copy of my notes so he could forward them to the FBI
which he was certain kept a file on him.

Nevertheless,

all of the respondents warmed up after the first couple
of questions.
My occupation probably helped with the law
enforcement interviews.

At least one such person told

me information he/she would not have told an ordinary
graduate student.

Several thought pursuing a masters

degree was worthwhile and wanted to help.
I fear another factor also effected the interviews:
my concern that I not appear to be on official business.
As a law enforcement officer, I am a pretty thorough
interviewer and normally ask follow up questions until a
particular point is exhausted.

But as a graduate

student, I was afraid that to interview in the same
manner, pressing for specifics, would give the
impression I was on official business.

Therefore, it is
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possible other graduate students may have been more
aggressive in a few instances.

I also did not wish to

put words into the mouths of my respondents.
A couple of other interesting points could be made
about the interviews.

Four of the respondents requested

that I not attribute statements or quotes directly to
them.

In one case, the respondent is prohibited from

discussing such matters by policy.

In another case, the

official was concerned such attribution may jeopardize
his/her re-election.

The other two were afraid candid

responses might jeopardize their jobs.
I also learned some respondents thought other
respondents were themselves corrupt.

But what I found

most interesting was when the aide of one respondent
asked the respondent if I should be frisked for a
recording device.

This happened before I described the

nature of the topic or revealed my occupation.
Three events occurred which may have influenced the
answers I received from some of the respondents.

First,

four North Las Vegas (NLV) police officers were arrested
on charges of drug distribution.

Two of my NLV

respondents mentioned the incident which occurred just
prior to the interviews.
Second, the media was reporting an on-going story
alleging judicial corruption (ticket-fixing) in the Las
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Vegas municipal court system.

Two of the respondents

mentioned this incident.
Finally, the media was also conducting extensive
coverage of a LVMPD investigation of individuals close
to casino magnate Steve Wynn.

One specific article

appearing in a Las Vegas Review-Journal article on April
11, 1993, was mentioned by one of the respondents.

The

article was entitled "Most wiretaps are dangerous," and
claimed LVMPD was abusing its power and wasting
government resources in a vendetta against associates of
Wynn.

It further implied spending large sums of money

on long-term investigations had better yield high crimes
or there would be serious consequences.
The respondent found the article persuasive in
suggesting police engage in vendetta's against "public
people" even though in this instance the persons
involved were not public officials.

Another respondent

indicated that for several weeks, this particular
investigation had been the talk of the legal community
of Las Vegas.
If I had it to do over again, I would change a few
things.

I would like to expand the pool of respondents

to include members of the media, state legislators and
lobbyists.

A course on Nevada politics dealing with
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which persons exercise power and influence would have
been extremely helpful.
I would also develop more questions dealing with an
FBI undercover operation called "YOBO."

As I began the

interviews I had largely ignored this investigation
because it occurred more than ten years ago and was
therefore old news.

I did not think many public

officials would remember much about it, but was wrong.
Some officials were in political office at the time of
the investigation and remember it as if it were
yesterday.

Others were and remain friends/acquaintances

of the convicted targets of that investigation.

Some

supported the investigation, others opposed it;

some of

the latter were people who supported UCOs in such
investigations, but not this particular one as it
unfolded.
In developing and testing my questionnaire (see
Appendix), I originally began with nine general
questions and one empirical statement.
my wife and a colleague.
thesis advisor.

I tested them on

They were also reviewed by my

Several of the questions were reworded

in order to consolidate, clarify meaning or eliminate
bias.

After advising my employer of what I was doing

(in the event he should receive phone calls about it),
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he suggested I reword certain questions so that they did
not refer to any specific law enforcement agency.
After a few interviews, I made other changes as
well.

I dropped the question about whether there is a

difference between beating and tricking someone out of
information.

From the responses I received, it seemed

the only person who sees no difference is the person who
wrote the article from which I drew the question.
In its place I asked a question about policy goals
of enforcement based on one respondent's position that
law enforcement agencies should not pursue a policy of
"zero tolerance," but should instead investigate those
matters where there is harm to the public and the public
cares.

Given the position and experience of this

official, I found his/her example fascinating.

To

paraphrase:
A bill is pending which provides 200 gallons of
water per minute. A developer wants a particular
legislator to support a bill for 300 gallons of
water per minute and offers to contribute $5,000 to
the official's campaign if he supports such a bill.
The official agrees and accepts the money. While
this is a bribe, there is no real harm done to the
public. Moreover, the public doesn't give a damn
if the official took the money or not in this
instance because there is no harm. Therefore, this
is not the sort of matter which should be
investigated by law enforcement agencies.
Other questions had to be explained.

Asking

someone to describe his/her perception of public
corruption was too broad often leaving the respondent no
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where to begin.

The question of environmental effects

and free choice frequently had to be repeated twice and
clarified.

I also had to stress that I was interested

in the public official's perceptions and what he/she
thought it was important for me to know in order to
avoid the response "I don't know."
One could argue that the final quantitative
question was influenced by the preceding discussion in
the interview.

That is probably true.

However, I

wanted a thoughtful response, not a snap judgment, and
that was another reason for avoiding a survey
questionnaire.
goal.

I believe my method contributed to that

I am confident that if I had mailed out a

questionnaire, I either would have received snap
judgments or no response at all (as happened with the
mayor of Las Vegas).
If I had advised my respondents of the questions
beforehand, I may have received different answers to
some of the questions.

It would have allowed them to

think about the issue, perhaps even do some research.
However, I do not think research was likely given the
busy schedules of the interviewees.
An alternative method which could yield greater
consensus would have been to either gather the
respondents for a group discussion or conduct follow-up
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interviews with feedback from other respondents.

Yet

this would be extremely time consuming for people with
busy schedules and probably not worth the commitment of
resources.
I found this project to be an interesting and
worthwhile learning exercise.

I certainly learned there

is no such thing as unanimous agreement even on issues I
thought were black and white.

In the end, I am left

with more questions about UCOs than when I began.

CHAPTER 2
Literature Review

It is interesting that the political significance
of law enforcement receives so little attention in
political science.

In that field, much study is

directed towards those factors which are believed to
influence the process of formulating regulation and law,
but not whether and how these rules are enforced.

The

study of policing is dominated by sociology,
particularly that specialized sub-field of criminal
justice, and various law journals.

Yet, as Morgan

(1980, 12) has suggested, "people commit crimes for
political reasons, and people justify crimes with
political rhetoric."
The increasing use of UCOs have caused some to
think that America is on an Orwellian course to a police
state;

one where fear, suspicion and distrust

characterize the way our citizens look at one another;
one where government lawlessness terrorizes the land,
invades privacy and restricts constitutional liberties.
In this literature review, I want to address the
broad issue of police UCOs.

UCOs raise a host of

political, ethical and social concerns similar to those
associated with covert action in foreign policy
(Johnston, 1992; Beitz, 1989; Johnson, 1989; M. Smith,
19
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1989; Treverton, 1989, 1987; Lefever and Godson, 1989).
Beginning in the early 1980s, UCOs gained a great deal
of publicity in the wake of the Watergate, Abscam and
Marion Barry scandals, but for the most part received no
rigorous ongoing reflection.

Quantitative studies are

almost nonexistent as far as I can determine.
Most of the so-called empirically grounded work is
based on case studies or anecdotal evidence and it is
not at all clear whether these are representative of
UCOs as a whole.

Critical pieces are therefore highly

impressionistic:

the conclusions of many authors that

this behavior leads to that abomination are little more
than logical assertions.
Even defining what we mean by undercover operation
is problematic.

Gary Marx is probably the most prolific

academic writer on the subject.

He suggests that

undercover work involves the use of covert and deceptive
means by government agencies (Marx, 1988).

He sees no

distinction between informants and sworn agents.
According to an earlier author with whom Marx might
agree, there are four types of government agents:

the

informant who "rats" on his fellow conspirators in order
to mitigate his own legal problems;

the police spy who

enters the conspiracy to observe and obtain information;
the "stool pigeon" who lures others into a trap;

and
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the infamous agent provocateur who joins the group in
order to destroy it (Donnelly, 1951).

Under this view,

undercover work is clearly an "evil” (Marx 1988) means
by the monolithic state to repress its people.

The

scope of the definition is so broad that the any use of
informants makes the investigation a UCO.
When no distinction is made between sworn agent and
informant, it is easier to argue that they should both
be held to the same standards.

More importantly, it

wrongly implies that law enforcement agencies can and
should be able to exercise the same degree of control
over their respective activities.
I argue that there is a clear and necessary
distinction between government agents and government
informants.

If we cannot distinguish sworn agents from

informants (as Marx and Donnelly believe), then we are
not likely to be able to distinguish an informant from
an ordinary citizen.

"Informants” (citizens who provide

information of interest and whose identities are
protected) have motivations other than saving their own
hides:

some are good citizens (or whistleblowers) who

for reasons of their own do not "wanna be involved," but
expect law enforcement agencies to take action; others
want money, revenge, excitement, respect or just some
sense of meaning to their lives not found elsewhere.
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Generally informants spend little time assisting
law enforcement.

They are not confined to a particular

class or occupation, but have other lives to lead and
greater priorities.

According to one respondent,

informants in public corruption investigations are
likely to be fellow officials whom the target has asked
to participate or support a particular corrupt act.
Informants may provide information about one specific
matter for a short period of time or they may provide
information applicable to a variety of investigations
over several years.

Their veracity also varies from one

to another.
Informants are not used strictly by law
enforcement.

Indeed, the media and academia often rely

on the information that only informants can provide.
Their rationales (people's right to know and search for
knowledge) can be no less damaging than police
informants, but their use is largely unquestioned.

In

fact, one could argue that the four respondents who
asked me not to use their names are "informants."

Yet I

am certain they would take offense to being called
"rats" or "stool pigeons."1
Miller limits the definition of undercover work to
"instances when a sworn officer, for organizationally
approved investigative purposes, adopts an encompassing
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but fictitious civic identity and maintains it as a
total identity over a defined and considerable period of
time." (Miller 1987, 28).

He finds it more useful to

distinguish undercover operations by the extent to which
a sworn officer's private life is merged with his
undercover role.

Thus, light undercover has minimal

impact and duration;

deep cover is a long-term total

submersion into the role.
I would agree with Sherman (1978) that UCOs are
activities which involve the use of covert agent to
obtain information without the subject becoming aware of
the presence of government agents.

Like Miller, I would

also limit the scope of undercover agent to include only
sworn officers, but I would not go so far as to assert
that they must be in undercover role for "a considerable
period of time."
UCOs can be proactive or reactive (regarding the
timing of the crime) (Marx 1988).
a crime or intelligence;

They seek evidence of

they may be short-term (one

time encounter) or of long duration (years); passive
(surveillance) or active (government intervention);
they may be targeted at specific groups (political,
criminal, etc.), individuals, or activities;

and they

may be directed at a specific crime or a more general
fishing expedition (such as an anti-fencing sting)

(Miller 1987).

In this paper I am only concerned with

UCOs directed at obtaining evidence of a specific crime
public corruption.
Dramaturgical Analysis

Some have approached the study of UCOs through
dramaturgical analysis of how an undercover agent is
able to assume and maintain his deceptive "self” while
interacting with the targets of investigation.

This

approach brings an element of theater to understanding
the nature of undercover work.

Undercover deception

thus requires extensive knowledge of the role an agent
must play, rehearsal, setting the stage, appearance
manipulation, verbal diversion and physical diversion
(Jacobs 1992, Nixdorf 1982).

The studies I looked at

used elite interviewing of one police department as
their methodology.

In dramaturgical analysis, the

emphasis is on the "how to" aspect of undercover work.
Questions of morality, legality and policy are not
asked.

However, most of the scholarly literature

surrounding the UCO issue addresses these questions.
Constitutional Approach

Morgan's analysis (1989) of historical documents
provides some examples suggesting the Founding Fathers,
particularly the Federalists, supported undercover
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operations.

In that time of political instability,

demonstrated by Shays' Rebellion, many supported covert
federal intervention into situations which either
spilled across state lines or were beyond the means of a
single state.

Their rationale was to preserve order,

protect life and property.
Objections to UCOs have been primarily made with
regards to their constitutionality.

Many oppose UCOs

because such operations violate the Constitution.

They

strongly disagree with the Supreme Court's majority
rulings which for 60 years have held UCOs to be both
constitutional and legal.

Opponents often attack the

logic behind court decisions favoring UCOs or reveal
some latent right protecting citizens against such
activities.

For example, UCOs involving government

intervention for purposes of prosecution violate
individual autonomy and the accused's "fundamental
right" to choose whether he wants to violate the law or
not (Stavsky 1985).
According to this argument, if the government had
not induced the crime, this particular crime never would
have occurred.

It rejects the "ready and willing"

doctrine used by courts (the former saying that a jury
should only convict if it finds beyond reasonable doubt
that the defendant was ready and willing to commit the
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"type" of offense charged whenever a propitious moment
arose)(Park 1976, 244-45).

However, Green (1988) makes

a strong case that autonomy and choice are separate
issues.

I will deal more with this matter in the

chapter on social contract theory.
First Amendment
The First Amendment is considered to be the most
important and fundamental under the constitution
(Bothwell 1990).

Freedom of speech, the press, religion

and association are sacred values.

Government efforts

at social control which are perceived to encroach upon
these rights attract a great deal of attention.

Under

this amendment, UCOs generally come under attack for
their "chilling" effect on political expression and
dissent.
Free speech and association can be lessened by
police surveillance.

Lundy (1969) further argues the

more recent "right" to anonymity prohibits the
government from obtaining information if its divulgence
will have a chilling effect on the exercise of any first
amendment rights.

These are particular concerns for

radical political dissidents, religious cults and other
minority groups.
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Fourth Amendment
Some see UCOs as an effort on the part of the
government to achieve secretly what it cannot obtain
openly and legally (Shoeman 1985).

Ordinarily police

cannot enter a home without probable cause and a
warrant.

Unlike traditional searches, the Supreme

Court's "invited informer" doctrine allows UCAs and
informants to be used in a limited fashion against
targets in the absence of probable cause or suspicion.
The invited informer doctrine holds that a UCA may enter
a suspect's home by invitation, but only for the
purposes contemplated by the suspect (Cook 1983).

The

courts have said a person willingly assumes the inherent
risks of being deceived in confiding in someone else who
is not what he claims to be (misplaced trust). There
are no restrictions on time and place (Iverson 1967).
The complaint here is that police are required to
obtain a search warrant unless, in an undercover
capacity, they can trick their way into a private area
and gain information.
Fifth Amendment
Miranda v. Arizona established the right to be
silent so that a suspect need not incriminate himself
through coercive police interrogation.

Yet UCOs employ

similar deceptions and psychological manipulation
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condemned by the courts in the interrogation room and
for that reason some feel they should be prohibited.
Incriminating statements obtained by secret agents
through trickery are no different in effect at trial
than are forced confessions (or any confessions).
According to this position, "(i)f the privilege is to be
preserved by demanding 'the knowing and intelligent
waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights,7
the requirement should logically encompass the entire
investigatory process." (Iverson 1967, 1005).
The courts have held that police may not obtain
information by deception from a suspect who is either
under arrest or indictment, but that he may only give up
his right against self-incrimination knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily.

Shoeman (1985) asks why

then do they not apply this same standard to people not
suspected of wrongdoing?
Central to the issue is the concern that government
agents are associating with and behaving like criminals.
Why can government agents lie, deceive and break the law
in order to catch someone else doing the same?

Why can

an undercover agent encourage, even induce, a citizen to
commit a crime and take part in the conspiracy himself?
Is the primary role of police to prevent crime or to
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punish it?

Should the behavior of government agents be

a living example to other citizens?
UCOs must be governed by more than law, but also
the values of society (Shoeman 1985).

Police use of

secrecy and deception must therefore be justified on
moral values and I will attempt to do this later in my
thesis.

While I advocate undercover operations, I do

not believe they should be used without thought and
reflection.
Utilitarian Approach
Some would justify UCOs on utilitarian grounds.
Undercover work seems to be an effective method for
achieving crime control objectives given the sheer
number and wide variety of crimes prosecuted (Girodo
1985).

Studies are mixed, but some have shown that UCOs

snare sophisticated career criminals who have been able
to thwart traditional investigative methods.

For

certain crimes, particularly drugs, UCOs are the most
economical, effective (and now most routine) means of
investigation.

Given the extremely high conviction rate

and greater penalties associated with undercover work,
many believe UCOs help keep these professional criminals
off the streets for longer periods of time (Weiner
1984) .
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Moreover, the possibility that one may be dealing
with a UCA has a profound deterrent effect on would-be
criminals.

Altogether then, UCOs produce the greatest

amount of good (protection from certain harmful
activities) for the greatest number of people.
In the context of American political culture, the
utilitarian approach fails to reconcile our need for
UCOs with other values we hold in high esteem.

It sets

no limits on the permissible so long as it is good for
the majority of citizens.

The mere fact that there are

limits (determined by guidelines, legal doctrines, etc.)
protecting the individual or minority from government
undercover operations suggests that some values are more
important than what is best for the majority.
Lies or Truth Approach

(T)hose who claim to stand above the fray and hold
the ring impartially for truth either lie or
deceive themselves. (Bell and Whaley 1991, 66-67)
Critics of UCOs seem to agree that operations
characterized by secrecy and deception are contrary to
open, honest and democratic government (Bok 1989, Brown
1989, Marx 1988, Treverton 1987, Iverson 1967).
Deception is wrong, unfair, un-American and contrary to
the will of the Founding Fathers.

When law enforcement

agencies engage in secret and deceptive practices, we
are somehow on the slippery slope to a police state.
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Trust is the foundation for many of our most
precious relationships (e.g. love, friendship, etc.) and
some of these relationships are protected by law from
law enforcement (such as communications between
doctor/patient, husband/wife, attorney/client and
cleric/penitent).

Some writers argue the lies,

deception and betrayals inherent in UCOs break down the
bonds of trust among individuals and groups, thereby
endangering all of society (Marx 1988, 1992; Bok 1989).
One congressional committee in its study of UCOs
thought undercover work, directed at political
corruption, also undermined the public's trust in
political institutions (U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights 1984,
hereafter House). Others have pointed out that lies and
deceit demean the police profession and erode the
public's perception of the distinction between the good
guys (cops) and the bad (criminals) because they are
engaged in similar behavior (Marx 1988).

Still others

have criticized UCOs as the "creation" of crime (for
institutional purposes) aimed at prosecuting the
innocent while the "real" criminals get away.
Prohibiting police deception would eliminate all these
concerns.
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Some have argued UCAs are potentially able to
manufacture the guilt of innocent targets through
manipulation and ambiguity.

This is particularly the

case when the UCO is combined with the use of electronic
surveillance (House 1984).

When the UCA meets with a

person involved in the crime, their conversation is
often coded.

If the UCA were to say, "This is bribe

money," the other participant would in all likelihood
believe he either was talking to an undercover cop or
that his conversation was being recorded.
But the avoidance of specificity allows room for
misinterpretation which may not be obvious to a jury
charged with determining whether a defendant has been
entrapped.

Moreover, the skilled UCA may deliberately

manipulate the target so that he makes incriminating
statements on tape.

Under such circumstances an

innocent party could conceivably be indicted and
convicted (House 1984).
Bell and Whaley (1991) point out that deception is
sometimes used not to achieve power, but justice.

Where

the stakes are high, resort to deceit is more likely
because the consequences of failure are more severe, but
with the goal of achieving a higher truth.

Deception is

thus a strategy used in war, in politics and, yes, in
law enforcement.
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One problem with the "truth or nothing" approach is
that secrecy (sometimes called privacy) and deception
are both endemic and necessary to human nature and law
enforcement.

Those who study these topics find that the

two permeate all social interaction (Bell and Whaley
1991, Bok 1989, Wilshire 1982, Goffman 1959, 1974).
They are indeed often necessary to provide power for
institutions (including law enforcement) to maintain
social order (Bailey 1991).
Deception is a source of power available to the
strong and the weak:

it is used by those who govern

public affairs, often as an alternative to coercion
(Bell and Whaley 1991).

In fact, the use of deception

by police agencies has increased due to the virtual
extinction of police brutality in the 1960s (Skolnick
and Leo 1992, Bok 1989, Marx 1988).
Equality

When I speak of equality, I mean equal treatment
for all citizens under the law.

All types of crime

should be investigated and prosecuted;

if government is

not willing to enforce certain laws, they should be
removed from the list of criminal statutes.
Traditional methods work well enough for murder and
bank robbery, but they are inadequate to identify and
prosecute invisible, coercive or consensual crimes such
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as price-fixing, drugs, prostitution, public corruption
and extortion (Stavsky 1985).

Violation of these

statutes
is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and
(with the exception of extortion) is generally
unattended with any particular harm to a definite
person. These offenses are carried on in secret
and the violators resort to many devices and
subterfuges to evade detection. It is rare for any
member of the public, whatever his attitude may be
in principle towards these offenses, to be willing
to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is
necessary, therefore, that government in detecting
and punishing violations of these statues rely, not
upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals,
but upon the diligence of its own officials. This
means that the police must be present at the time
the offenses are committed either in an undercover
capacity or through spies and stool pigeons.
(Donnelly 1951, 1094)
When citizen witnesses are unable or unwilling to
provide information and the uniform drives information
underground, government agents either must go undercover
or ignore the offense (Miller 1987).

Only an undercover

agent could obtain the necessary evidence for successful
prosecution of the crimes described above (Marx 1988).
If UCOs were made illegal, some groups of criminals
would walk the streets with impunity.

UCOs are thus

often justified on moral grounds of equality in the
sense of justice for all.
Judicial Approach
The courts have taken the lead in tackling the
issue of UCOs.

Yet many consider them incapable of the
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task.

The following section traces the evolution of

judicial thinking regarding undercover work.
A hundred years ago the courts were not
particularly sympathetic to the accused caught in the
government's snare.

One 19th Century New York Supreme

Court justice summed up the prevailing sentiment nicely:
Even if inducements to commit crime could be
assumed to exist in this case, the allegation of
the defendant would be but the repetition of the
plea as ancient as the world, and first interposed
in Paradise: 'The serpent beguiled me and I did
eat.' That defense was overruled by the great
Lawgiver, and whatever estimate we may form, or
whatever judgment we pass upon the character or
conduct of the tempter, this plea has never since
availed to shield crime or give indemnity to the
culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code
of civilized, not to say Christian ethics, it never
will. (Marcus 1986, 9)
Not everyone agreed, of course.

In 1878, Justice

Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court became irate when a
police officer allowed and assisted an attorney to go
forward with a burglary so that he could be prosecuted.
Cooley reasoned that the officer had a duty to prevent
crime and take steps which would elevate and improve the
character of the would-be criminal.

"Human nature is

frail enough at best, and requires no encouragement in
wrong-doing." (Marcus 1986, 10-11)
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis argued in 1928 that
no government agent "has the power to authorize the
violation of an Act of Congress and no conduct of an
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officer can excuse the violation." (U.S. v. Casey)

The

idea of government encouraging or participating in a
conspiracy to violate one of its own laws cuts to the
heart of the philosophical debate.
Four years later the Supreme Court took a different
stand.

In the landmark U.S. v. Sorrells (1932), the

majority of the Supreme Court first recognized the
legality of UCOs and established the doctrine and
theoretical basis of entrapment.

The courts noted that

the literal interpretation of statutes could potentially
produce unfair and unjust results as a result of UCOs.
Under such circumstances, Congress could not have
intended "that its processes of detection and
enforcement should be abused by the instigation by
government officials of an act on the part of persons
otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its
commission and to punish them." (U.S. v. Sorrells. 448).
The majority court has consistently maintained this
position for decades (e.g. in U.S. v. Jacobson 1992).
The court reasoned that an entrapped person is
innocent of the crime (a question for the jury);

and

that an entrapped person is one not "predisposed" to
commit the offense (Marcus 1986) . Nondisposed persons
are believed to be less culpable and dangerous to
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society than those predisposed.

Hence, they should be

exonerated (Park 1976).
The focus of the entrapment doctrine is on the
defendant's predisposition demonstrated by his actions
and statements, not the conduct of government agents
(Kukura 1993).

Critics argue that the logic of the

predisposition doctrine requires entrapment to include
situations where the tempter is a private individual.
Yet exempting individuals "entrapped" by private (as
opposed to government) persons would stimulate
collusion, false claims and other contrived defenses.
Conspirators would then be free to lay the blame on a
fall guy or fugitive co-conspirator (Park 1976).
Predisposition has been criticized for requiring a
"crypto-Calvinistic" view of human nature where people
are born with a tendency toward guilt or innocence
(Gerschman 1982).

These critics do not believe the

government should pursue the former any more than the
latter, even where the former has a criminal track
record.
Yet perhaps it is these people against whom the
public demands protection from the government.

One

writer argues that there is no
'fundamental principle of equality under law' which
requires that past offenders be treated exactly the
same as persons with clean records... the
"ameliorative hopes of modern penology" have not
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lived up to expectations. Prison rehabilitation
efforts have rarely succeeded. If agents do pursue
past offenders with special zeal, this practice
may actually deter crime by increasing the risk of
detection. (Park 260)
The court majority rejected the minority view that
courts have the power to grant immunity to the guilty
(the function of the executive branch) for objectionable
conduct on the part of government officials (U.S. v.
Sorrells) except where there are grossly repeated
efforts to induce crime (Cook 1983).
The minority of the Court rejected legislative
intent, defendant's guilt or predisposition.

For the

minority, the real concern was the protection of the
courts and government from the "prostitution of the
criminal law" (U.S. v. Sorrells. 457) by government
agents manufacturing crime (U.S. v. Russell 1973) .
Russell had the further distinction of establishing
the doctrine of "outrageous government conduct," a due
process defense replete with constitutional
ramifications (Nichols 1984).

According to Russell,

outrageous government conduct is decided by the judge as
a matter of law, not by a jury, based on the totality of
the circumstances.

Essentially this doctrine holds that

the ends do not justify the means.

The court offered no

example of such behavior, only that it must be shocking
to the universal sense of fairness and justice (U.S. v.
Russell).

Some lower courts have since held that the
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conduct in question is limited to police brutality,
physical or psychological coercion against the defendant
(U.S. v. Bogart). According to Majeske (1985), the
defense is rarely successful.
Courts have traditionally chosen to use the Fourth
Amendment to control police behavior because its
language is flexible (bars only unreasonable searches
and seizures) and provides judicial supervision (via
warrant requirements) (Lundy 1969).

However, judicial

control is limited and awkward because of
the difficulty of applying constitutional
protection to 'intangibles' under the fourth
amendment...the theory of 'consent' or 'assumption
of risk' as applied to the undercover agent
situation...and the idea that scientific or
technological investigative methods (electronic
surveillance) pose a greater threat to privacy than
do those which depend on deception, disguise or
deceit. (Lundy 1969, 652)
The Court's majority has consistently maintained
that entrapment is a limited defense, without
constitutional dimensions, that is not intended as a
judicial veto of overzealous police practices deemed
unsavory by judges.
The execution of the federal laws under our
Constitution is confided primarily to the Executive
Branch of the government, subject to applicable
constitutional and statutory limitations and to
judicially fashioned rules to enforce those
limitations. (U.S. v. Russell. 423)
To illustrate how far some courts are willing to
allow an undercover operative to go, the 9th Circuit
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(U.S. v. Simpson1 held that the deceptive creation and
exploitation of an intimate (sexual) relationship is a
permissible UCO tactic because an informer must have
considerable latitude in establishing a relationship
with a suspect.

The Court found that government agents

may use methods which are neither savory nor moral (by
abstract standards of decency) in their quest for
information.

The Court further reasoned that it was not

a suitable forum for determining universal standards of
intimacy beyond which government agents could not go
without violating the due process clause (Gundred 1988).
It is therefore up to the executive and legislative
branches to set those standards.
It is interesting that in investigations of
judicial case-fixing, some courts have found no legal or
constitutional problem when undercover agents lie under
oath in order to obtain evidence of bribery (this
without the knowledge of the presiding judge and target
of investigation) (Majeske 1985).
Skolnick and Leo (1992) have determined that the
acceptability of police deception by the courts varies
inversely with the criminal process.

Where there is

little or no suspicion of wrongdoing, agents are free to
routinely deceive those from whom they want information
or evidence, regardless of whether the agents are
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undercover.

However, as the investigation reaches more

serious stages (such as courtroom or grand jury
testimony), police are prohibited from lies and deceit.
There is no constitutional threshold requirement
for mounting a UCO against a target (Gerschman 1982),
although the courts have indicated one could be
statutorily imposed (Cook 1983).

For many, then, the

constitutional safeguards developed by the Supreme Court
are not adequate to control secret investigative
methods.

Courts have been reluctant to restrain use of

clandestine techniques less they prohibit them
altogether (Lundy 1969).
The basic defense against the secret agent remains
the doctrine of "entrapment".

However, entrapment only

helps "control government solicitation of crimes and
does not reach passive undercover activities such as
spying or subverting friends." (Iverson 1967, 994-995).
Furthermore, police use UCOs to achieve other goals such
as the collection of intelligence and the preservation
of order.

The courts are limited to reviewing those

cases aimed only at prosecution.
The Court's minority has always been concerned with
controlling police behavior and would make that behavior
the central question when the issue of entrapment is
raised.

In U.S. v . Sherman (1928), the Court expressed
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concern that by allowing juries to decide the issue of
entrapment, the courts would be unable to set standards
of appropriate police/informer conduct in undercover
operations (Gundred 1988).
Some scholars suggest that people are ignorant
about UCOs and the dangers they pose against citizens
(Lundy 1969);

that people are easily manipulated by a

skillful prosecutor and a persuasive undercover agent.
Accordingly, juries are unqualified to determine whether
the undercover technique is legal and necessary in a
given case.

For these critics, the only acceptable

solution would be court authorization prior to
conducting a UCO as is the case with electronic
surveillance.
While federal and some state statutes require a
court order for wiretaps, it would be a mistake to
overemphasize the similarities between undercover and
electronic investigative techniques.

Both involve

issues of privacy, secrecy and occasionally violating
the law (e.g. breaking and entering to install a
microphone).

Yet an agent passively monitoring

conversations from a remote location has far greater
control over his situation and safety than a UCA
interacting with his co-conspirators.
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The circumstances in which a monitoring agent finds
himself are predictable allowing a judge to set
requirements over a considerable period of time.

A

judge can simply direct an agent to listen to this type
of conversation, not to that.

On the other hand, the

circumstances for a UCA are unpredictable even in the
short run.

Judicial controls would entail a judge being

involved in the investigation frequently, if not on a
daily basis.
Thus, judicial approval of UCOs would have the same
limitation as other judicial remedies.

Its advocates

base their hopes on the unlikely assumption that courts
have the ability to anticipate and control the various
unpredictable circumstances which occur when the UCA
(agent or informer) interacts with the target (Park
1976).
Legislative Approach

Congress did not really pay much attention to
undercover operations per se until charges were brought
in the Abscam investigation.

The U.S. House of

Representatives Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights and the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study
Undercover activities of Components of the Department of
Justice (hereafter Senate 1983) focused their research
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primarily on the FBI and particularly those cases
involving political corruption.
The congressional approach to the study of
undercover operations was to solicit testimony from
experts across the spectrum including law enforcement
agencies, targets, civil libertarians and third party
victims.

These hearings produced a wealth of

comprehensive information, but little quantitative data.
The cases Congress looked at were not so much
representative of typical UCOs as they were the scope of
these activities and their consequences.

Their reports,

highly critical of UCOs, generated intense pressure for
the Attorney General to revamp internal guidelines
(particularly restricting UCOs where the subjects are
public officials), but did not result in the passage of
any legislation.
In my research I was surprised to learn that Abscam
did not generate legislation controlling UCOs.

Instead,

Congress limited its efforts to those involving
political corruption.

It seems that it was one thing to

use the technique against drug dealers and prostitutes,
and quite another to apply it to respected leaders of
the community.
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Targets

Opponents often approach undercover work because
they disagree with the targets of those operations.
This is the case for those who see UCOs primarily as a
tool of political repression.

There are numerous

accounts of FBI intelligence operations unlawfully
conducted in order to "disrupt and neutralize" domestic
political groups (Summers 1993, Poveda 1990, Churchill
and Vander Hall 1988, Theoharis 1978) which resulted in
scandal and reform.
Summers (1993) authored the latest scathing attack
on J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI.

He charges that Hoover

used the FBI to illegally collect sensitive, private,
derogatory or criminal information about political
opponents, particularly leftists and members of the U.S.
Congress, in order to smear, discredit and undermine
individuals and groups against whom Hoover was opposed.
Page after page alleges that Hoover himself was corrupt;
that he was guilty of extorting presidents, receiving
bribes, associating with organized crime figures and
defrauding the government.

Summers further implies that

Hoover authorized political murders and was himself
assassinated by his political enemies.

Prior to his

death, Hoover controlled politicians, university staffs,
local police departments, the national media and
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ultimately the nation's political process with a
"swollen" force of 4,000 agents.
It is important to note that according to Summers,
Hoover obtained this information primarily through
electronic surveillance and the use of informants.
are "police state" tactics.

Both

Hoover also used FBI agents

to intimidate political opponents through overt
interviews.

Yet fewer than ten of more than 400 pages

of text referred to UCOs.
Churchill and Vander Wall (1988) allege that the
FBI destroyed the American Indian Movement through UCOs
and other tactics.

But they go one (extreme) step

further by suggesting that this was part of a wider
conspiracy in which the members of all three branches of
government deliberately use the FBI to systematically
destroy political opposition.
Specifically, we argue that the Bureau was founded,
maintained and steadily expanded as a mechanism to
forestall, curtail and repress the expression of
political diversity within the United States to
preserve the status quo...regardless of its
"abuses," even at the moment when it was
conclusively demonstrated to have so far exceeded
its authority as to have temporarily threatened the
stability of the status quo itself (12-13).
Other accounts (Gelbspan 1991, Berlet 1991, Donner 1990)
describe conspiracies in one form or another where the
FBI and other intelligence/police agencies continue to
hunt down and destroy agents for social change.
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Langworthy and LeBeau (1992) raise a more
interesting concern regarding UCO targeting.

Their

study indicated that the location of a "sting" site is
of critical importance because a sting normally draws
local clientele.

Police are somewhat constrained in

their choices in that the UCO must appear "natural" if
it is to deceive a potential criminal.

Thus, the

potential for selective and discriminatory enforcement
is great in that police could target one locality over
another on the basis of ethnicity, politics, etc.
These accounts, particularly Summers book, are
significant in two ways for the purposes of this study.
First, they point out that any investigative tool
(whether an interview, search warrant or UCO) can be
abused.

To oppose UCOs on the basis of past targeting

or that they might potentially be abused is not so much
an indictment of the technique itself as it is the
purpose for which it is used.
confuse the two.

Yet many equate and

Targeting is certainly a legitimate

question in any investigation, but it is only one aspect
of UCOs.
Second, Summers work also gives some insight to the
effect of corruption on the political process.

Let's

assume for a moment that all of his allegations
regarding Hoover's abuses are true;

that he was able to
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control and manipulate public officials at the highest
levels of government for illegal or immoral purposes
because of what he maintained on them in his secret
files.

I have to ask myself, what information could he

have on presidents and congressman that would prevent
them from executing the sworn duties of their political
office?

Wasn't this the age of all-powerful committee

chairmen?

In other courses, haven't I heard of the

"imperial presidency" and the concentration of powers
into the hands of the Chief Executive?

Hoover and his

senior aides should have been prosecuted and sent to
prison if what Summers says is true.
Yet Summers points out that Hoover knew Truman owed
his political success to organized crime boss Tom
Pendergast.

Kennedy, whose father was closely

associated with organized crime, exchanged white
envelopes with Chicago crime boss Sam Giancana through a
mutual lover.

His brother may have murdered Marilyn

Monroe to keep her from exposing a love affair with the
Kennedy brothers.

Johnson made his start political

start by ballot-rigging.
break-ins.

And Nixon authorized illegal

All this is to say nothing about congressman

and justices of the Supreme Court.

I have to ask

myself, was corruption so prevalent and systemic that a
crooked law enforcement chief could not even be fired,
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let alone prosecuted?

And if so, how much better is it

today?
Police Discretion and
the Slippery Slope

One other approach is to look at how UCOs are
controlled.

UCOs of the FBI are largely controlled

through internal guidelines, some of which were adopted
in the wake of Abscam and the congressional
investigations and revelations of the 1970s.

These

include the Attorney General's Guidelines on Criminal
Investigations of Individuals and Organizations,
Guidelines on Use of FBI Informants and Confidential
Sources, and Guidelines for FBI Undercover Activities
(Senate 1983).

These guidelines are not enforceable in

court (Elliff 1984), but are grounds for declining
prosecution.
When the aim of a UCO is intelligence rather than
evidence, the UCO escapes nearly all controls outside
the agency itself.

Use of information covertly obtained

is not subject to judicial or legislative review except
insofar as laws are broken or public outcry is heard.
Critics object to placing so much discretion and self
regulation in the hands of a law enforcement agency.
From Klockars' (1985) work, one might say that what
bothers us most about UCOs (and police work in general)
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is this enormous discretion granted to police regarding
which crimes to enforce and the means of enforcing them.
The uncertain potential for abuse and arbitrary
enforcement is almost maddening.

For writers critical

of UCOs, it has led to a presumption that we are on the
slippery slope to a police state and an obsession with
accountability and external controls.
In his comparative study of police systems, Bayley
(1985) argues that this mistrust is a part of a broader
cultural orientation.

He finds that in contractual

societies such as ours (see Chapter 3), there is a
preference for external controls over group activities.
Americans do not trust the police to regulate
themselves. In order to assure conformity to
community wishes, Americans put their faith in
external scrutiny and correction by politicians,
civil service boards, ad hoc commissions, courts,
complaints committees, and private organizations
such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People. (Bayley 1985, 182)
Japan, a communitarian society positively affected
to the state, prefers internal mechanisms of group
control such as professional dedication and personal
responsibility.

The Japanese are more trusting of their

police and bureaucracy in general.

They perceive

themselves as having a higher capacity for self
regulation.

Gaps and Social Contract Theory
The focus on the legality and control has left gaps
in our understanding of UCOs in terms of whether such
operations are good policy.

Ultimately, we find a

consensus among scholars that UCOs are necessary, but no
general agreement about when and how they can be used
with justification.

Discussion has taken place among

legal scholars, academics, undercover agents and a few
moral philosophers, but no quantitative or qualitative
research has been directed towards ascertaining public
opinion of elites or rank and file citizens in a local
community.
In my thesis I hope to accomplish two things:
first, to show how UCOs can be justified as a means to
investigate a specific category of crime according to
social contract principles;

second, to capture elite

perceptions reflecting a consensus supporting undercover
work in the greater Las Vegas area.
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Chapter Notes
1. The historical Western hatred for informants goes
back at least 2,000 years. The New Testament describes
a fugitive (Jesus) wanted by the Roman authorities who
had orders from a magistrate (Pontius Pilate). For a
few dollars, the Romans were able to recruit an
informant (Judas) whose information led to the
successful capture of a wanted man. Since that time,
Westerners have taken a dim view of anonymous citizens
cooperating with law enforcement authorities.
2. Although popular in American culture, problems arise
with conspiracy theories. The presumption that agencies
(and even the entire state) behave as a monolithic
entity is difficult to support empirically. If the
state is not monolithic, then UCOs could conceivably be
used to purge dissent within the status quo (thereby
undermining the status quo and the argument posed by
Churchill and Vander Hall). Another problem is that
American police/intelligence agencies simply do not
possess the resources and capabilities to exercise the
type of control described by proponents of conspiracy
theories. In fact, the resources allocated towards
domestic intelligence falls far behind other
investigative efforts and priorities (Poveda 1990).

CHAPTER 3
Some Background
Undercover operations (UCOs) conducted by law
enforcement agencies represent one of the more
controversial issues in American law and society.
According to congressional investigations and academic
studies, covert investigative methods by police threaten
first, fourth, fifth, sixth and ninth amendment
liberties and protections and may constitute an abuse of
legitimate government power.
UCOs have been around for more than a hundred years
in America, yet it wasn't until the mid-Twentieth
Century when they really started to come into their own.
Their scope has expanded from property and victimless
crimes to virtually the entire range of criminal
statutes, and some areas that are not criminal.

The

proliferating number of agencies using the UCOs and
their growing budgets reflect a dramatic increase in the
use of the undercover technique (Girodo 1991).
The use of undercover work in policing originated
in the private sector (Marx 1988), eventually was
adopted by government police agencies, and is now
enjoying a resurgence within private police agencies
(Johnston 1992).

Anyone who watches television or reads

newspapers can see the media too now frequently goes
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undercover to expose corruption in industry and low
levels of government.

In this chapter I will address

the historical rationales giving rise to federal UCOs
and briefly discuss an FBI undercover investigation
code-named "YOBO."
The spread of totalitarianism in the 1930s led
President Roosevelt to order the FBI to investigate
"subversive” groups in the United States.

With the

outbreak of WWII, he further expanded the FBI's
jurisdiction and directed that these investigations be
conducted through covert means to gather information and
evidence of political, economic, financial, or
industrial threats of subversion (Senate 1983).
The traditional role of police was to deter crime
through the visible presence of a uniform.

As social

and technological conditions changed, new sophisticated
types of crime and criminal organizations emerged and
the traditional role had less effect (Marx 1982).
While this was occurring, Americans' view of their
role as citizens in policing society was changing.
became less reliant on themselves and demanded more
protection from government.

In time, they came to

believe police work is a function of government.
Moreover, studies have indicated that Americans fear

They
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rising crime levels far more than abuses of police power
and granted more powers accordingly (Marx 1988) .
Since the 1960s changes in crime patterns have been
accompanied by changes in law enforcement priorities.
Organized crime, domestic terrorism and civil disorders,
political assassins, drug cartels, increasing violent
crimes all were perceived as gripping the nation.

These

problems were exacerbated by political scandals of the
1970s such as Watergate.

It seemed corruption and crime

plagued government from the smallest locality to the
highest political office in the land.
At the same time, the public began to demand
criminal accountability for white collar crimes (Marx
1988).

It seemed patently unfair to prosecute a car

thief for a thousand dollar crime and not go after the
attorneys, bankers, brokers, public officials and others
engaged in multimillion dollar crimes.
Perhaps the greatest crime stimulant for UCOs in
recent history has been drugs.

Drugs remain a top

priority for every level of law enforcement.

Moreover,

it seems that every agency wants to be involved because
of the money that pours into the agency's budget.
Bureau of Land Management;

Parks and Recreation;

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms;
Naturalization Service;

The

Immigration and

and everyone else is tripping
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over one another to get into the action.

The laws are

harsh, the work is prolific, relatively easy and highly
supported by the general public.

And the best way to

work a drug case is through some sort of undercover
technique.
Traditional methods were inadequate to identify and
prosecute consensual crimes such as price-fixing, bidrigging, political payoffs, extortion.

In many of these

crimes, the victims are the public at large,
corporations, consumers and taxpayers.

White collar

criminals who were once handled in civil courts can now
be held criminally liable if the government is able to
show criminal intent.

For many such crimes, only an

undercover agent could obtain the necessary evidence for
prosecution.
Technological changes occurring in wire
communications, transportation and the like facilitated
interstate crimes on an order never before seen in
history.

Telephones allow persons to coordinate and

direct criminal activities in different locales within
minutes whereas previous efforts were delayed due to the
need for messengers, mail service or face-to-face
meetings.
These new technologies also created opportunities
for new crimes (e.g. environmental crimes and money

laundering) (Marx 1988) as well as new investigative
tools facilitating undercover work.

For example,

electronic surveillance and recording devices
substantially improved the credibility of witness sworn
testimony in court.

This has had a decisive impact on

public corruption cases.

For the first time, a jury is

in a position to witness what was said and done in
certain meetings and telephone conversations.

Juries

can thus determine whether a defendant was eager or
reluctant to commit a crime;

whether a UCA was coercive

and harassing or merely offering the opportunity;

and

whether the government's inducement was reasonable under
the circumstances.

The effect has been to weaken the

defendant's claim he was entrapped by overzealous or
politically motivated law enforcement agents out to
smear his name.

In this study, one respondent said the

only aspect he can remember of the Marion Barry trial
was the videotape of him smoking cocaine.
Meanwhile there were changes in organizations.

J.

Edgar Hoover was dead (he opposed the undercover
technique) and Congress demanded that the FBI use its
considerable resources for more complex investigations
(Senate 1983).

The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was

created as well as the Public Integrity Section of the
Department of Justice.

58
Marx (1988) has argued that Supreme Court decisions
such as Miranda v. Arizona indirectly encouraged UCOs by
restricting traditional investigative techniques.
Problems with the rules of evidence, the search for
a suspect, interrogation, suspect's rights, guilt,
and testimony are less likely to occur if an
undercover officer has been a direct party to the
offense, and it has been electronically recorded.
Courts directly supported UCOs by finding them
legal and necessary;
camera;

by accepting guilty pleas in

by authorizing consensual electronic

recordings;

and by not applying stringent fourth

amendment standards to the "invited informant"
situations (Marx 1988).
Furthermore, the courts have found UCAs do not
possess the criminal "intent" required to be prosecuted
for crimes they commit in furtherance of the
investigation.

Many state legislatures, in fact, have

enacted "justification" statutes authorizing such
operations (Majeske 1985).
Congress encouraged UCOs by broadening the scope of
federal crime, demanding the prosecution of more complex
crimes, and perhaps most importantly, by not legislating
severe restrictions on UCOs (Marx 1988).

The Racketeer

Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Hobbs Act,
Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering and
other broad statutes have not only expanded the reach of
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the law, but also placed a heavy emphasis on getting all
members of the conspiracy or enterprise.
UCOs also came to be seen as having the dual
purpose of protecting while obtaining evidence of
wrongdoing.

The government substitutes agents for

citizen victims in many types of crimes allowing the
apprehension of offenders under "controlled"
circumstances (Marx 1988) .
In summary, the Twentieth Century brought
tremendous changes in technology, political
institutions, crime and the citizens role in police
work.

The trend has been to grant more powers to public

law enforcement agencies who now are charged with
greater responsibilities for policing society.
Yobo
In the early 1980s, the Las Vegas division of the
FBI conducted an undercover investigation into
allegations of public corruption in the state of Nevada.
The operation was code-named "YOBO" and lasted
approximately 18 months.

At the very end of my research

I had the opportunity to have lunch with the two agents
most intimately involved in the investigation.

Together

they provided much of the information described below.
"YOBO" began as a "spin-off" from a public
corruption investigation conducted in the Phoenix
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division of the FBI.

A UCA in that case became

acquainted with a Phoenix chiropractor.

The

chiropractor advised he wanted to invest in Nevada and
had said as much to Gene Echols, a Nevada state senator.
Echols claimed to have the political connections
necessary to get the necessary approvals by key Nevada
public officials, but that it would cost the
chiropractor money.

The chiropractor then passed this

information on to the Phoenix agent.
During the sting, Steve Rybar, using the pseudonym
Steve Reilly, posed as the representative of a group of
25 chiropractors located in Phoenix, Arizona.

The

physicians owned a company called "Doctors Fiduciary
Trust" and were interested in investing in various
projects throughout Nevada.

These projects required

zoning changes as well as various approvals and voting
support from Nevada lawmakers.

To obtain political

support and favors, Reilly was willing to pay bribes to
public officials.
In reality, of course, "Doctors Fiduciary Trust"
was an FBI front.

The Phoenix chiropractor agreed to

introduce a UCA to Echols, the only individual targeted
by the government.

Echols met Rybar as well as another

UCA who subsequently was transferred from the Las Vegas
office.

Echols and the UCA drafted a written contract
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where Echols pledged to use his political office on the
UCA's behalf in exchange for a monthly "consulting" fee.
The bribe arrangement was so blatant that the
prosecuting attorney sent Rybar back to ensure Echols
knew exactly what he was doing.

Echols had no problem

with the arrangement.
Echols, after satisfying himself the UCA was what
he represented himself to be, then introduced the UCA to
other officials some of whom he claimed were willing to
offer the public services for money.

These in turn put

the UCA in contact with still other public officials.
In this way, the targets of the case were "selfselecting."
ideas;

Rybar and other agents came up with project

Echols and other targets told Rybar who would

help for money and who would not.

According to the two

interviewees, the investigation was not a fishing
expedition, but directed only at those they believed to
be corrupt based on specific and credible information
from the targets themselves as well as other informants.
Prior to meeting with a target, the UCA and case
agent normally met with the prosecuting attorney and
went over what was likely to happen.

As much as

possible, the meeting was scripted so that (1) no target
would be entrapped and (2) the meeting would yield clear
evidence of the violation and intent on the part of the

subject.

Supervisors at FBI headquarters were

frequently (almost daily) apprised of the facts of the
case and were requested to approve major events (e.g.
authorizing a particular payoff). At the time, "YOBO"
was considered one of the top ten investigations in the
FBI.

Interestingly, the special agent in charge (SAC)

of the Las Vegas division knew little about the
investigation after it was launched.

Immediately after

the UCO became public, the Sun reported the SAC had a
vendetta against Nevada politicians.
During meetings with several officials, many of
which were audio and/or video recorded, the UCA offered
bribes in exchange for political favors.
took the money;

others turned it down.

Some officials
No one reported

bribe attempts to law enforcement authorities or anyone
else.

The sting was reported in the media prior to

indictments being handed down by a federal grand jury.
According to the interviewees, the UCO surfaced as a
result of several coordinated FBI interviews of various
targets approached throughout the investigation.
In the end, "YOBO" resulted in the indictment and
conviction of state senators Gene Echols and Floyd Lamb;
Clark County commissioners Woodrow Wilson and Jack
Pettiti;
Reno.

and one city councilman, Joe McClelland, of

All defendants denied wrongdoing stating they had
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been entrapped by the UCA.

However, the entrapment plea

was rejected by the jury in every trial and the
convictions were upheld on appeal.
Lamb was the most significant of the targets given
his powerful position and influence in the Nevada
legislature.

One piece of evidence which helped convict

him was when Lamb tried to stuff a cash payoff inside
his shirt.

While the scene was not videotaped, the

audio recording demonstrated Lamb was trying to hide the
money.

In fact, the UCA warned Lamb the money was

visible through his shirt and the two men laughed about
it.

Lamb was also recorded demanding additional payoffs

from Rybar if the latter wanted Lamb's services to
continue.
Jack Pettiti demonstrated to the jury's
satisfaction his willingness to accept a bribe.

On one

occasion, Pettiti received a cash payoff in an elevator
over the span of eight seconds.

Pettiti then left the

building and took the money directly to a safety deposit
box.

It was clear from this and other evidence that

this was Pettiti's routine behavior.
The eighteen month operation cost the taxpayers
about $160,000 in expenses excluding agents' salaries.
This was less than the interest earned on the "show
money" deposited in a local bank which convinced Lamb
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the UCA was "real."

The two agents believe the

investigation was good for the community.

It is still

talked about today by public officials who warn others
to watch out who they talk to.

They regret that one

public official in particular was not indicted because
he was the worst of the offenders.

That individual has

since gone on to higher political office.
The interviewees believe corruption still exists
and is a problem in Las Vegas, but that is less today
than twelve years ago.

However, they also believe

corrupt public officials today are much more
sophisticated and careful in their illegal dealings.
The two interviewees believed the good-old-boy
network was much stronger twelve years ago than it is
today.

It is still together and influential, but many

outsiders have come into the area and taken public
offices.

The good-old-boy network probably persuaded

the Nevada Bar Association to allow convicted former
judge Harry Claiborne to continue his law practice in
the state of Nevada.
Local newspaper reporting of the operation could
not have been more different.

The Las Vegas Review-

Journal (hereafter R-Jl was positively disposed toward
the investigation.
Day had this to say:

On May 5, 1982, R-J columnist Ned

65
For the honest public officials who refused to take
the bait and for the average citizen who's the real
victim of public corruption, it's a time of pure,
unadulterated joy (Day 1982, 11B).
He warned readers to expect a "public relations
blitz" depicting the FBI as the real villain because
they used UCOs to catch bribe-takers.
Still, despite any public relations blitz, it would
be hard to swallow the idea that FBI agents are bad
guys because they want to put corrupt public
officials in jail (Day, 11B).
In a May 7, 1982, editorial, the R-J stated
"Abscam-type probes have been upheld repeatedly in the
courts.

They have great value in identifying the

crooked and discouraging the possibly crooked."

The

editors further did not believe the local FBI office had
a vendetta against Nevada public officials.
The Las Vegas Sun (hereafter Sun) denounced the
sting.

In an editorial appearing on May 5, 1982, Hank

Greenspun strongly criticized the FBI for wasting
government resources on a fishing expedition designed to
entrap Nevada public officials with business ties.
Those resources should have been spent investigating
espionage and organized crime.

He was concerned the

names of the innocent would be dragged through "public
scrutiny." (Greenspun 1982, 1-2)
Over the course of a few days, the Sun's
journalists reported the FBI spent two million dollars
of taxpayers money and caught no one.

Two headlines on
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May 6, 1982, were as follows:

"Ex-U.S. Prosecutor

charges deceit FBI agents lied," and "Investigate the
FBI."

In the former, Jeffrey M. German pointed out in

the small print that the former prosecutor now
represented one of the key targets of the investigation.
In the latter article, Greenspun stated the UCAs
should be prosecuted for violating Nevada statutes by
offering bribes to public officials.

Moreover, as a

result of the sting, public officials would now have to
look after themselves by investigating every constituent
visitor.
The Nevada legislature retaliated by prohibiting
state agencies from issuing undercover identification to
federal law enforcement agents.

It also made it illegal

for businesses to use the word "trust" unless such
businesses are supervised by the superintendent of banks
or commissioners of savings associations.

At the time,

Senator Alan Glover stated the measure would prevent the
FBI from using "trust" in any undercover operations it
may have in Nevada.
"YOBO" made quite an impression on public officials
more than a decade after the last trial was completed.
Yet was the undercover investigation justified?

As I

shall discuss in the next chapter, it certainly was if
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we use the principles of social contract theory as the
basis for evaluation.

CHAPTER 4
Social Contract and Public Corruption
If men know not their duty, what is there that can
force them to obey the laws? An army you will say.
But what shall force the army? (Hobbes in Lloyd
1992)
In the 17th and 18th Centuries, contract theory
reached the height of its influence on ethical thinking
in Western culture.
founding.

This was the period of our nation's

From the time of the Puritans, elements of

social contract theory have left an indelible imprint on
our political values which remains to this day (Gough
1957).
Social contract theory has played a prominent role
in America's struggle for liberty, religious freedom and
justice and is the underpinning for our Constitution and
the rule of law (Cohen and Feldberg 1991, Barker 1967) .
It is more consistent with our political culture than
other theories and can lead to a better understanding of
our criminal justice system.

Accordingly, contract

theory provides a suitable framework for analyzing the
role of police in the United States.
Traditionally, the theory has been used to analyze
and justify the proper structure of institutions
(Buchanan 1977, Replogle 1989). It is my contention that
social contract theory can yield guiding principles for
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evaluating policy choices with regard to police
undercover investigations.
functions:

These principles serve two

first, they establish theoretical limits on

the circumstances which justify the use of UCOs;
second, they suggest certain areas where these
operations should be directed.

Other writers on the

topic of UCOs, such as Gary Marx, have been preoccupied
with establishing judicial and statutory controls aimed
at reducing the use of such operations.

My concern is

to provide theoretical criteria for justifying the
investigative method.
As a moral ideal, the social contract does not tell
us why we behave (in a certain manner), but how we
should behave;

that is, we in government and society

ought to behave as if there were a social contract
(McCormick 1987).
I will incorporate aspects of various arguments put
forward by different contractarians in order to develop
a suitable model.

To begin, I should point out that I

am not looking at contract theory as a historical
explanation of the origin of government (or UCOs).
Rather, I seek to use the hypothetical contract to
explain the ideal relationship between law enforcement
agencies and the communities in which they serve;

and

how UCOs may be justified in an open and free society.
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Social contract theory relies to some extent on
self-interest and fear as motivating factors encouraging
social cooperation;
relies on conscience.

more importantly, I think, it also
It suggests there is a moral

obligation to keep one's promises, to fulfill one's end
of the bargain, thereby recognizing and respecting the
rights of others (Lessnoff 1986).
The Individual and Equality
Social contract theory is deeply influenced by
Christianity.

According to this religion, all people

are created equally in God's own image;

God endows each

person with the capacity for free thought and action.
He can thus hold them individually accountable for
keeping His Commandments (Locke 1966, Replogle 1989).
Contractarians place this idea of individuality
(the idea of isolated, rational and autonomous persons
existing prior to state and society) at the heart of
their argument (Hampton 1986).

They strip the

individual of any advantage or disadvantage he may
possess in the empirical world in order to arrive at the
concept of the generic human being, also called rational
man (McCormick 1987).

For the contractarian, all

individuals are basically equal in mental and physical
abilities in the state of nature (Hobbes 1991).
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The assumption of human equality leads to two other
assumptions regarding human nature:

First, leaders must

be chosen and government must be formed through
cooperation since no one individual is naturally
superior to another (Hampton 1986).

Second, all

individuals have equal moral value in the state of
nature (Gough 1957) and thus deserve equal consideration
and treatment (Replogle 1989).
Hobbes (1991) argued if persons share the same
basic ingredients and attributes, they nevertheless
develop different sets of concerns in the real world.
Differences over fundamental interests occur as a result
of poor reasoning or defects of the mind (Lloyd 1992);
people simply do not see where their "true" interests
lie.
This is not to suggest rational people should agree
on every matter;

only that they agree on a minimum

number of certain shared interests necessary for
cooperative living.

Individuals are responsible for

overcoming their ignorance through education and
reflection so that they can recognize their true
interests (Lloyd 1992).
Free Will and Consent
The concept of "free will" is at the core of social
contract theory.

Like the concepts of human
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individuality and equality, the idea of "will" was
strongly influenced by Christian thinkers.

According to

St. Augustine, if men did not possess a free will then
it would be unjust to punish or reward them for their
behavior.

In fact, the idea of right and wrongful

behavior would be nonsensical (Riley 1982).
For most contractarians, will is a choosing faculty
informed by reason that enables us to control ourselves
and follow rules:
the will becomes a faculty that binds us when we
freely choose something...that is not caused. One
must assume the possibility of a free action that
is binding for the reason that morality depends in
part on undetermined choice...in the sense that we
are free to accept or reject the reason (for such
willing), thereby earning justifiable praise or
blame...(Riley 1982)
Will is therefore not an appetite (as it would be in
theories of determinism, causality and necessity) nor a
product of human environment (Hampton 1986).

Here I may

be at odds with Hobbes who in fact did describe will as
"the last appetite in deliberating" (Smith 1989, 63) .
The social contract's appeal to rationalism further
presupposes that choices will be made according to
certain criteria.

This may seem contrary to the notion

of free will (Lessnoff 1986).

However, as Pinkard

(1987) points out, respecting the capacity for choice
and the actual choice are different matters.

The

concept of the generic rational man implies a capacity
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to discover, through reason and science, moral
principles for guiding behavior.

"Will" enables us to

follow these principles which, as McCormick (1987)
argues, the rational man will find compelling and in his
best interest.

In this way, we have the capacity to be

self-determining, to affect what happens to us (Van
Gunsteren 1978).
In general, contractarians believe that a person's
will cannot be manipulated in any meaningful sense.
"Being influenced or persuaded by reasons would not
count as being determined by causes (e.g. coercion),
precisely because making up one's mind is 'an act of
one's own,' whereas falling or being pushed is not."
(Riley 1982, 12).
Using one's capacity to choose, then,
involves a certain critical reflection and
evaluation of those values... independent of
external elements... an autonomous choice could not
be a manipulated choice. (Pinkard 1987)
State of Nature and Need
for Government

If we recognize that each human being possesses a
free will which he uses to determine his actions, it
follows that the causes of conflict must be attributable
to the private beliefs and actions of men;

furthermore,

it is only men who can resolve them (Lloyd 1992).
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For the contractarian, the state of nature is
inevitably characterized by competition, conflict and
corruption.

To quote Hobbes, the state of nature

is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of
violent death; And the life of man, solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short (Tuck 1991, 89) .
The state of nature is a condition where each
individual pursues his own separate interests, acts as
his own judge and enforces his own private judgments
(Barker 1967, Nurmi 1978).

In the state of nature,

everyone is less secure in life, liberty and property
and seeks a way to escape this condition.
Social contract theory holds that individuals have
certain fundamental, equal and inalienable private
rights in the state of nature (Replogle 1989).
and justice are to name but two.

Liberty

Persons do not give up

these rights when they enter society.

If we enter into

some cooperative interaction with one another, it is
only because we believe it to be somehow instrumental in
furthering our own interests (Hampton 1986) and
preserving our natural rights (Duncan 1978).

Protection

from harm caused by other individuals is foremost among
those interests (Duncan 1978).
The Nature of Government

The source of government power, authority and
legitimacy sharply distinguishes social contract theory
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from other theories of government.

For contractarians,

power and legitimacy are derived from the consent of the
people;

not from God, customary obedience (Gough 1957),

coercion, practical necessity, rule of the wise,
patriarchy, theocracy, natural superiority, convenience,
historical evolution (Steiner 1978, Riley 1982) or
transcendental norms of economic efficiency and natural
law (Buchanan 1977).
Social contract theory is traditionally more
concerned with the protective role of governing bodies
and the basis for their legitimacy.

Government is best

conceptualized as an agency hired by people (Hampton
1986);

it is created for the purpose of maintaining

order necessary to secure liberty and justice for the
contracting parties.

For the contractarian, government

is a means to an end (Hampton 1986).
To escape the horrid state of nature, men choose
from among themselves those who will serve as impartial
referees and enforcers.
government.

These chosen few form

People lend that government powers

sufficient to ascertain the facts;

and to make and

enforce decisions according to rules on which they all
agree (Barker 1967).

Government is formed to protect

natural rights (by resolving disputes authoritatively),
maintain order and preserve liberty (Hampton 1986).
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Government is therefore created voluntarily and
deliberately by rational individuals who agree to its
constitution (Barker 1967).

In this way, each person

secures his "vital interests" (Replogle 1989), those of
such importance that attacks on them would jeopardize
cooperation (Pinkard 1987).

It follows that the

interests of the government are those of the citizens
and not the self-interests of those occupying political
office (Hampton 1986).

Rulers should neither govern nor

make policies contrary to will of the people.
Logically, the agreement between contracting
parties must be reached unanimously and benefit all.

It

makes no sense for persons of equality to unite
voluntarily for the benefit of some at the expense of
others (Gough 1957).

The result of the agreement (i.e.

government) must treat all participants equally under
the laws on which they agreed.
If unanimity is required, it follows that there are
few interests which could meet this criteria.

These are

called variously fundamental interests, natural rights,
etc.

Essentially, they are the minimum standards on

which all can be presumed to agree for the purpose of
promoting and preserving security, liberty and justice
(Reiman 1979).

Contractarians envisage government as an external
party to conflict between individuals with competing
claims.

It functions as a neutral umpire deciding who

has a right to what according to the rules on which all
citizens have a agreed (Lehning 1978).

It then protects

that right with the power and authority granted by the
contracting parties (Cohen and Feldberg 1991).
Principles of Social
Contract Theory

Foremost among the principles of social contract
theory is liberty.

Social contract theory is a way of

expressing "the value of Liberty, or the idea that will,
not force, is the basis of government..." (Barker 1967,
viii).
There are two kinds of liberty in social contract
theory.

First, we have an inalienable right to positive

liberty.

Positive liberty consists of those conditions

which allow each of us to reach our full potential, to
be free from the arbitrary harm caused by others (Green
1988, Berg 1978).

The end of law enforcement is to

protect and expand positive liberty, not to subdue and
restrain the individual (Locke 1966) . Nevertheless,
positive liberty is closely associated with order and
stability.

These conditions make it possible to act

with more freedom (Van Gunsteren 1978).
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The second kind of liberty, called negative
liberty, is the absence of restraints on an individual's
actions;

we are all free to do and grab whatever we can

get away with.

"Cherished negative liberties, like

freedom of speech, religion and association, are
internal to the political process of representative
democracy..." (Replogle 1989, 194), but are not higherorder goods in social contract theory.

The point here

is not that the freedoms described above are
unimportant.

Indeed they are sacred to us and should

not be restricted without reason.

However, such

freedoms can and have been necessarily traded away for
more positive liberty (Replogle 1989, Decker 1979) .
Social contract is a way of expressing "the value
of Justice, or the idea that right, not might, is the
basis of all political society." (Barker 1967, viii).
The tacit or expressed consent of each and every citizen
(generic man) in the hypothetical contract is what
morally justifies the power of the state to regulate
men's lives.

A citizen is more likely to tolerate

restrictions on his natural liberty if he perceives them
as emerging from a process in which he participated;
one where his interests were taken into account and the
results of which he imposes on himself (Berg 1978,
Buchanan 1977, Pinkard 1987, Gough 1957).
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To test whether a particular law or practice is
just, contractarians ask:

If every informed person

(hypothetically) could agree to the matter in question,
it is just;

if consent cannot possibly be unanimous,

then it is unjust (Lessnoff 1986, Replogle 1989).
Therefore, justice should be seen as a process which
yields governing principles, not the principles
themselves (Ball 1979).
It is important that the process of justice yield
principles and not strict rules (Decker 1979).
Principles are flexible standards.

Unlike rules which

are rigid and uncompromising, two principles may
conflict with each other without either one of them
being false (Pinkard 1987).
Principles...are generally invoked to mitigate the
harshness of a regime of pure rules; where the
strong, who are capable of manipulating the rules
to their own advantage (or can find or purchase the
services of someone who can) manage the system of
rules to triumph over the weak, principles are
employed to show that this was not, for example,
the point of the law. (Pinkard 1987, 101)
A rational individual will find the principles
derived from social contract theory compelling because
with them he can make his life better and more secure.
A rational person should accept these principles in the
same way a patient accepts medicine;

they should be

administered accordingly (Hampton 1986).
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A contract involves at least two parties and an
impartial judge (Minogue 1978).

In the deliberate

negotiation, there is mutual give and take between the
contracting parties so that everyone's interest is taken
into account.

The contracting parties reconcile their

conflicts of interest and determine rights and
obligations for themselves (Lessnoff 1986).

Out of

respect for the other contracting parties, participants
are obligated to comply with and support the enforcement
of the terms of their agreement (Gough 1957, McCormick
1987) .
Negotiation and reconciliation requires compromise,
a double-edged sword.

In one sense, compromise is

conducive to diversity, tolerance, mutual respect and
empathy.

A successful compromise can minimize the need

to manipulate or coerce fellow citizens.
Successful compromise depends, above all, on the
commitment, skill, and integrity of the politicians
exercising power and pursuing goals. The act of
compromising tends to corrode every aspect of these
assumptions (Dobel 1990, 140) .
When a group leader compromises he can gain new
supporters, more power, and more allies.

At some point,

compromising to acquire and retain more power can take
precedence over achieving the original goal.

This is

the other side of compromise, the side associated with
weakness and lack of conviction.

"Once politicians feel
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no qualms about compromise, they often have lost part of
their moral compass." (Dobel 1990, 145).

The result is

public corruption.
Social contract thus does not eliminate the causes
of competition and conflict of interests;

it only

reconciles them and is thus consistent with a pluralist
society (Lively 1978).

Why, then, must there be a

promise to do one's duty?

Rational individuals should

fulfill their obligations for reasons of self-interest;
if they fail their obligations, they alienate themselves
and endanger their survival.

David Hume was one who

thought self-interest alone would bind men to their
commitments without recourse to a contract.

He worried

that if men were bound by conscience (i.e. a promise),
they would submit to tyranny rather than cease obedience
(Hampton 1986).
Hume's point is well-taken.

Yet social contract

theory recognizes self-interest alone is often not
sufficient motivation for persons to behave
appropriately.

The analogy of a contract provides a

moral incentive for individuals to cooperate (Green
1988).
Hegel's Critique
Hegel among others criticized social contract
theory on a number of fronts.

However, his main point
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was that empiricism's method (deduction) is not adequate
to show that human beings have permanent "rights" to
certain necessities under "natural law."

The method,

drawing on cultural experience and tradition, is
incapable of determining the necessary from what is
merely desirable.

Instead, it is a circular argument

based on loaded assumptions (and the social conditions
of the period) leading to a presupposed outcome
(S. Smith 1989).
Hegel offers a powerful criticism.

Still, I think

it is reasonable to rely on certain assumptions
regardless of whether they are culturally inspired so
long as one makes no claim to universality of the
"rights," rules and obligations developed from the
deductive process.
Americans' affinity for the rule of law, justice as
process and a preoccupation with "rights" and legalism
is part of who we are and is compatible with social
contract theory.

All I seek to accomplish in this

thesis is to give a reasonable explanation of why public
officials should behave as if there were a social
contract;
agreement;

what I see as the logical outcome of that
and how UCOs can be justifiably employed in

public corruption matters.

I make an assumption that

public corruption would be far worse in the absence of
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UCOs and that such a "state of nature" is not in the
interests of this community.
Public Office
A promise, in the form of an oath of political
office, serves as a higher obligation in much the same
way as religion and codes of honor have done in the past
and still do today.

It imposes a moral obligation that

helps bind us to our commitments.

In those instances

when we have abandoned our reason, a promise appeals to
our emotional and spiritual side in order that we may do
the right thing.
An oath of office also puts the promisor on notice
that he has made a moral commitment to others thereby
formally subjecting himself to a higher standard and
closer public scrutiny than ordinary citizens.

This

holds true for police officers as well as members of
city councils, county commission, judges, etc.

When

public officials swear their oaths of office, they swear
to execute their duties on behalf of all citizens
impartially and without arbitrary benefit of one over
another.

While they may benefit from taking office,

public officials cannot do so contrary to the purpose of
their office or at the expense of those they have agreed
to serve.

The public retains the right to judge their

official's performance and they obtain this information
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in part from investigative agencies they have created
and empowered.
Public Corruption
Let me now say a few words about public corruption.
Benjamin Franklin warned, "There is no kind of
dishonesty into which otherwise good people fall, than
that of defrauding the government." (Miller 1992, x) .
Indeed, corruption of public officials has plagued this
nation from its founding to the present day.
Public corruption involves the "intentional
misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty, or with
the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of
gaining some advantage more or less directly personal
(Brooks 1970, 58).

Here I have limited this definition

to actions proscribed by law.

They include political

bribery, extortion, kickbacks and fraud.
In his history of American corruption, Nathan
Miller (1992) suggests Americans have always had a
love/hate relationship with public graft.

"We demand

upright government but have sneaking contempt for the
priggishness of reformers and a relish for scalawags"
(ix-x). Given our ambivalence, the question in my mind
is, should federal law enforcement agencies try to do
something to reduce corruption in our community?
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Certainly corruption has its supporters.

Robert

Klitgaard, in Controlling Corruption (1988), suggested
that certain specific acts of corruption might have
economic, political or organizational benefits.
Economically, corruption introduces a market mechanism
to allocate resources to those most willing and able to
pay for them, rather than on a basis of merit, random
selection or first come, first served.
Politically, corruption has the advantage of
developing linkages among elites of various groups which
can serve to stabilize and unify.

Finally, corruption

within a government agency can allow employees to
supplement low incomes and get around ridiculous
policies.
Yet Klitgaard's work is about controlling, not
promoting, corruption.

He argues corruption is

generally harmful benefiting the rich or powerful at the
expense of the poor and noninfluential. Economically,
it wastes resources as public officials expect, seek and
demand bribes or political favors for carrying out their
duties.

By creating exclusive political "linkages"

(elsewhere called the "old-boy-network"), corruption
breaks down public trust and confidence;
citizens from their officials;

alienates

breeds cynicism leading

to corruption by the general population;

results in
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safety and environmental problems;

and discourages

meritocracy.
There is some evidence that Hobbes thought public
corruption was inexcusable:
And of those defects in Reasoning, there is none
that can Excuse...a Crime, in any man, that
pretendeth to the administration of his own private
business; much lesse in them that undertake a
publique charge...(Hobbes 204)
And again:
The same Fact done against the Law, if it proceed
from Presumption of strength, riches, or friends to
resist those that are to execute the Law, is a
greater Crime, than if it proceed from hope of not
being discovered, or of escape by flight: For
Presumption of impunity by force, is a Root, from
whence springeth, at all times, and upon all
temptations, a contempt of all Lawes...(Hobbes,
209)
For the contractarian, public corruption is among
the worst of all crimes.

When public officials accept

bribes for favors or extort citizens, they breach their
public trust and make the matter worse by having their
crime enforced by law;

they abrogate their role as an

impartial judge and decision-maker which is essential to
the reconciliation process (Lively 1978).
Corruption benefits a few at the expense of others.
Given the scope of government's authority over its
citizens, corruption is the ultimate betrayal.
Individuals in a state of nature would not consent to
such activity.

A corrupt official believes
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that all of them but one (himself) should be under
the restraint of laws, but that he should still
retain all the liberty of the state of nature,
increased with power, and made licentious by
impunity. This is to think that men are so foolish
that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be
done them by polecats or foxes, but are content,
nay think it safely, to be devoured by lions.
(Locke, in Lessnoff 62-63)
Justifying Undercover
Operations
To summarize, social contract theory holds that
every individual, who by virtue of being a person
possessing the capacity to reason and reflect, is
further endowed with a free will to make choices in his
life.

His capacity for choice cannot be manipulated in

any meaningful sense, but in fact is subject to his own
volition.

Since he is responsible for his own actions,

he can be held accountable.
From these assumptions, it will become clear that
incriminating information obtained from an undercover
operation involving deception is vastly different from
that obtained from coercion, a distinction critics of
UCOs are slow to recognize.
The most important aspect of designing a UCO, from
a practical point of view, is that the circumstances
must appear "natural" to the person(s) involved in the
criminal activity.

Anything in the environment which

seems somehow out of place will alert the person that
something is wrong.

Whether the undercover agent (UCA)
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is posing as a hitman, a wealthy lobbyist, or a drug
dealer, he/she must appear "real" to the person involved
in criminal activity.
Since the subject is operating in what he perceives
to be a natural environment, he has the opportunity to
reflect on his situation and make his own choice.

He

chooses his course of action based on his own values and
judgments.

The rest of us do not have to agree with him

and support his choice.

Although the government may

have injected itself into another's reality, the person
is not being "pushed" into committing a crime:
choice is his.

the

A UCO thus respects a persons capacity

to choose despite the actual choice made.
On the other hand, coercion does not allow for
choice except in the most perverse sense of the term.
Coercion compels a person to incriminate himself in
order to stop the coercion.

Herein lies the difference

between information obtained through the use of coercion
and deception:

to yield to force is an act motivated by

the need to ease one's suffering (Hobbes 1991);

to

yield to the temptation offered in undercover work is
motivated by one's own will.

The former is dependent on

others while the latter is dependent on oneself.
Perhaps at this point I should discuss the
entrapment doctrine.

It is my contention subjective
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entrapment cannot be reconciled with social contract
theory's concept of free will.

Entrapment holds a

person not predisposed to commit a crime can be
manipulated by government agents into committing such a
crime.

The person really has no choice, but is

compelled by the circumstances to commit a criminal act
he would not otherwise.

According to this view, "will"

must be considered an appetite, not a faculty of choice.
Here I am in agreement with the judge in the
serpent case above.

The identity of the tempter should

make no difference whether the person commits the
proscribed act or not.
This does not mean UCOs cannot be attacked on other
grounds.

For example, we may find such operations

morally repugnant, regardless of the good intentions
behind them, because UCAs lie, deceive, betray and break
laws;

UCOs may not be economically feasible;

they may

destroy the trust between individuals in society;
may not like fishing expeditions.

or we

For all of these

reasons and more, one could proscribe government agents
from engaging in UCOs or certain acts.

But the weakest

argument is that a person presumably possessing his good
mental health did not choose whether he should commit
the act or not;

that instead he behaved like a sheep.
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I have established that UCOs cannot be unjust if we
were to use freedom to choose as the criteria for
justice.

However, respecting the capacity for choice is

not enough.

Contractarians also require that citizens

should voluntarily agree on the use of the technique.
Governments can only use those means on which the
citizens have agreed or else it is abusing, not
protecting, their interests (Steiner 1978).
This criterion is more problematic.

Nevertheless,

we should remember that in the social contract framework
outlined above, we are concerned with what rational
persons ought to agree to in the ideal contract.

When

we agree on the rules of the game, it is with the
expectation that we are all equally accountable for our
actions.

Each of these individuals consents to be

punished if he breaks the law (Primoratz 1989).
No rational person would agree that he should be
held accountable while others are not.

At the same

time, a rational person would agree to the use of UCOs
only if they made him better off.

This is why our

assumptions about the state of nature, or what
conditions would be like in the absence of UCOs, are
crucial.
As indicated above, certain criminals in the past
were exempt from investigation and prosecution because
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their crimes were undetectable by conventional means
prior to the introduction of UCOs as an enforcement
technique.

Public corruption requires not only secrecy,

but minimal documentation and camouflage.
In nearly every instance of alleged graft the
accused has an explanation differing from the
interpretation offered by the prosecutor. The
meanest sort of ''steal" is sometimes transformed by
the graft artist into a great deed for the
promotion of the public welfare or at least a bit
of harmless pillaging of the rich for the benefit
of the poor (Key 1970, 49).
Corruption also requires close protective
relationships among corrupt officials.

Unlike other

targets of UCOs such as prostitutes and drug-dealers,
public officials are respected community leaders whose
words carry a great deal of credibility and influence.
Corrupt public officials can protect themselves by
creating a network or support group which excludes
non-trusted members.

By coming to the defense of one

another, they may effectively thwart prosecution of any
one of their group.
If UCOs were made illegal, some politically
powerful groups of criminals and organizations, among
them corrupt public officials, would walk the streets
with impunity.

Justice as equal treatment under the law

would have little meaning.

As a result, citizens would

suffer a loss of positive liberty.

A rational person

could not possibly agree to allow such activities to
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occur at the expense of his own interests.

A rational

person must agree to the use of UCOs which protect him
from harm caused by others, particularly if this harm is
at the hand of corrupt public officials.

A government

which tolerated the criminal activity by failing to use
UCOs would be acting unjustly.
In a democratic republic, people express a quasi
consent through their elected representatives.

Several

points suggest the people have not only granted their
consent to, but have demanded the use of UCOs.

First,

juries almost never find that a defendant was entrapped
by government agents (Lundy 1969).

Second, Congress

demanded in the 1970s that the FBI start using its
resources (which included UCOs) to combat the crimes
described above (Senate Report 1983).

Third, the Courts

have found UCOs to be necessary and legal.

The final

point has to do with the absence of legal restraints on
UCOs.

The silence of the law allows behavior not

proscribed by the sovereign (which here is the people
expressed through their elected representatives). Thus,
consent for UCOs is expressed through silence on the
part of Congress with respect to passing legislation
controlling UCOs.
It follows that the people, through their elected
representatives, created federal law enforcement
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agencies for the purpose of protecting them from harm
caused by others.

The agencies are entrusted with

certain limited powers and techniques (including UCOs)
which are necessary to carry out their mission.
Rational persons would demand that federal agencies use
these tools to fulfill their obligation.
Controls
Hobbes (1991) thought people were obliged to obey a
ruler possessing the power to maintain order and
attached no other conditions.

It seems likely that he

would approve of the use of UCOs under any circumstances
deemed appropriate by the government in power.
One of the key aspects of Lockean social contract
is that it justifies and limits the powers of government
through the doctrine of inalienable natural rights and
consent of the governed (Lessnoff 1986).

Unlike Hobbes,

who believed people surrendered their power to an
absolute sovereign, Locke considered government an
agency hired by the people who lend the sovereign part
of their power in order to perform certain tasks
(Hampton 1986) which will protect citizens from each
other.

Yet like Hobbes, Locke saw no grounds for

rebellion.
Some modern contractarians have returned to the
social contract model existing prior to Hobbes and
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Locke.

That is, the emphasis of complying with the

contract is on the government, not the citizen.

Here,

the public retains the right to judge whether the
government is furthering or endangering their interests
(Hampton 1986).
Under the theory of trusteeship, the people could
take these powers away anytime for any reason.

However,

according to more recent contractarians, these powers
can only be taken away or restricted under certain
conditions (i.e. when the agency fails to meet its
contractual obligations to the public, whether it be
through abuse, neglect or incompetence [Gough 1957]).
When a government agency such as the FBI fails in its
protective role, citizens have a duty to demand it meet
its obligations or replace it with one that will (Cohen
and Feldberg 1991).
The principles derived from social contract theory
morally limit how the FBI and other law enforcement
agencies can use UCOs in a way that utilitarian
arguments cannot.

It calls for some reflection

regarding the purpose of the law and not merely blind
enforcement (Cohen and Feldberg 1991).

UCOs are

justified when they protect positive liberty (protection
from harm caused by others);

further the process of

justice (equal treatment under the law);

and when they
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are perceived as benefiting each and every person.

This

precludes UCOs undertaken for the benefit of the
agency's self-interests at the expense of the public's
(Green 1988) or to promote the values of one group over
another.
The question citizens and agents should ask
themselves regarding whether a particular UCO is
justified is this:

Under relevant circumstances, is it

possible that reflective and autonomous citizens could
agree on the use of the technique?

This line of

inquiry, with its emphasis on protection and consensus,
should be inculcated in law enforcement training.

Such

training would probably be more useful in controlling
the use of UCOs than the hopeless task of devising a
bunch of rules governing all occasions.
Yet the purpose of social contract theoretical
principles is not so much to restrict as to guide men's
actions (Lasslett 1966).

They obligate federal agencies

to enforce the law to the extent of their ability and
means.

The question I posed in the preceding paragraph

may even suggest UCOs be expanded in certain areas.

At

a minimum, it suggests federal agencies should
concentrate their undercover efforts on those criminal
activities most harmful and unjust:

public corruption.

96

Contract Revisited
Why do we need a social contract?

A social

contract, like a constitution but broader in scope, is
an idea by which we can evaluate policies, derive
principles, maintain continuity and educate people
regarding their own particular role.
Social contract theory offers an explanation to the
questions, Why was government created and what are the
obligations to which the parties (citizens and
government) have agreed?
us of who the boss is;

The concept of agency reminds
that the people hired the agency

to promote certain interests and can fire it if its
policies and practices, by design or incompetence, are
contrary to the reasons that justified its empowerment
(Hampton 1986).
But more importantly, a social contract, which
today we see in the form of elections and political
appointments consummated by the oath of public office,
provides a moral incentive for sworn officials to keep
their obligations.

It allows the public to hold these

individuals to a higher standard and subject them to
closer scrutiny.

The principles of liberty, justice as

equal treatment, and consensus justify the use of UCOs,
particularly those aimed at public corruption.
Depending on the nature of that corruption, they might
even require increased use of undercover work.

CHAPTER 5
Elite Perceptions
The data in my study of governmental elite
perceptions can only render tentative conclusions and
suggest additional hypotheses for further study.
Nevertheless, despite its small size, I think the study
contributes to our understanding of public corruption
and police undercover operations in Clark County.

I

caution the reader that what follows are the perceptions
of various public officials.

The substance of what they

say may or not be true, and can be used as a possible
guide for further inquiry.
This chapter compares and discusses the responses
of the public officials interviewed based on sex, age,
political party, years in public office, and type of
public office held.

I have also included the responses

of ethnic minorities because they made up a substantial
share of the interviewees.
Nature of Corruption
Table 1 reveals most respondents believe public
corruption, defined as illegal conduct, to be a
relatively small problem in our community.1
not all agreed.

However,

Five of the respondents believed

corruption to be a systemic problem.
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Significantly, two

of these were at the federal level.

One federal

respondent went so far as to describe public corruption
locally as today's organized crime;

it is worse than

bank robberies because it harms every citizen.

From

this and other remarks in the interviews, my impression
is that federal agencies perceive corruption in Las
Vegas to be a much greater problem than local public
officials.
Table l. Nature of Public Corruption
in Greater Las Vegas
Respondents

Big Problem

Small Problem

Total

Male
Female

4
1

12
7

16
8

Age 47 or less
Age 48 or more

4
1

8
11

12
12

Democrat
Republican
Nonpartisan

1
3
1

13
6
0

14
9
1

Minority

1

4

5

16(—) years service 4
18(+) years service 1

8
11

12
12

Judges

1

9

10

Commissioner/
Councilman/
Mayor

1

6

7

Prosecutor/
Law Enforcement

3

4

7

26

99

125

Total
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Good-Old-Boy Network
Four women as well as one man (the latter was not a
native of Nevada) cited the "good-old-boy" network as a
contributing factor in public corruption.

According to

three of the respondents, "good-old-boys" use their
influence and positions of power to take care of their
friends;

to protect them from investigation.

Two other

respondents complained that everyone knows who is
corrupt, but no one will do anything about them because
of their connections.

The other respondent has seen the

network used to see friends get certain jobs, political
appointments, even avoid prosecution for certain
misdeeds.2
According to one judge, police take too long to do
something about corruption.

They allow corruption to go

on for years without stopping it because of political
pressures and influence.

A law enforcement official has

observed that some judges are not prosecuted for
criminal misconduct, but are allowed to resign so they
can retain good standing in the bar.

Both commissioners

have seen cases swept under the carpet by the district
attorney because of political ties.
The Environment
Other factors relate to the private sector.
Table 2 shows that more than half of the respondents
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believe environmental circumstances determine or
influence the choices of public officials in our
community.

The following is how some of the respondents

described the local environment in which politics are
conducted.
Nevada is essentially a "company” state dominated
by two industries:

gaming (formerly called gambling,

Table 2. Does Free Choice or Environment
Determine Public Official Behavior

Respondents

Environment

Varies

Choice

Total

Male
Female

1
0

7
5

8
3

16
8

Age 47 or less
Age 48 or more

1
0

5
7

6
5

12
12

Democrat
Republican
Nonpartisan

1
0
0

7
4
1

6
5
0

14
9
1

Minority

0

3

2

5

16(—) years service
18(+) years service

1
0

6
6

5
6

12
12

Judges

0

6

4

10

Commissioner/
Councilman/
Mayor

1

4

2

7

Prosecutor/
Law Enforcement

0

2

5

7

Total

5

63

57

125
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soon to be called entertainment) and telemarketing (many
of which are boiler-room operations). Therefore there
are only two wells from which to draw campaign
contributions.3

The lack of diversity within industry

fosters closer relationships among public and business
officials resulting in greater corruption than in other
states which have a more diversified industrial base.
This argument suggests some ongoing relevance of
the Federalist Papers.

In "The Federalist No. 10,"

James Madison addressed the danger of too little
competition among powerful groups.

He warned that in a

democracy, the majority group would be able "to
sacrifice to its...interest, both the public good and
the rights of other citizens." (Kammen 1986, 148).
Indeed, Madison could have been describing Nevada when
he wrote:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be
the distinct parties and interests composing it;
the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the
more frequently will a majority be found of the
same party; and the smaller the number of
individuals composing a majority, and the smaller
the compasss within which they are placed, the more
easily will they concert and execute their plans of
oppression. (Kammen, 151).
Oppression is probably too strong of word to describe
the nature of corruption in Las Vegas.
point is well-taken.

But Madison's

102
A couple of respondents suggested corruption is no
more prevalent in the public sector than in the private;
it is merely more visible.

The gaming industry, with

its extensive cash environment as well as complimentary
meals, rooms, shows, etc., and emphasis on paying money
(or "juice") for better service, seats, jobs and so
forth, breeds a public tolerance for corruption not
found elsewhere in other cities.

Federal respondents

also believed the public and local media are more
tolerant of corruption than their counterparts
elsewhere.
On the other hand, another judge believes the
private sector takes its cue from public officials.

If

the latter are perceived to be corrupt (as they are
today), people will think corruption is okay for
themselves thereby undermining societal mores.
Still another judge thought public corruption is a
constant problem everywhere because people are by nature
greedy.

It isn't always money that corrupts.

power, prestige and position.

It's also

Greater Las Vegas only

differs from other areas because here corruption is more
blatant.
Another contributing factor in corruption is the
fact that honest elected officials must gain the support
of corrupt colleagues if they are to get their own
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legislation approved.

As one judge put it to me, "You

have to go along to get along."4

The same judge

thought public corruption lies on a continuum which
cannot be divorced from other behavior considered
legitimate.

Consequently there is a gray area open to

interpretation.

Others disagreed pointing out that

while ethical problems may lie in a gray area, public
corruption is clearly identifiable and illegal.
According to one local law enforcement official,
another reason corruption is a problem is that UCOs are
not conducted often enough to have a deterrent effect.
Another local officer was of the opinion that greed
would outweigh the deterrent value of UCOs.

UCOs merely

cause a corrupt public official to be more careful with
whom he commits corrupt acts. (But isn't this a
deterrent of sorts?). This sentiment was echoed by an
elected official who thought the level of corruption was
the same now as ten years ago, but then you could get
away with it.
Two councilmen thought part of the corruption
problem stems from the fact that state legislators pass
legislation proscribing certain conduct, but exempt
themselves.

According to one of the councilman, such

exemption recently occurred at the local level in the
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city of Las Vegas.

Laws were changed so that actions

which used to be corrupt would not be any longer.
Witnesses

Finding witnesses in Las Vegas willing to testify
against a public official is a problem for several
reasons, according to one city councilman.

People

refuse to testify against public corrupt officials
either for fear the investigation will spill-over onto
themselves or that retaliatory measures will be taken
against them by corrupt officials and their allies.
Whistleblowing carries substantial risks.

One

respondent cited a recent media account of judicial
ticket-fixing.

The judge who reported the matter is

under attack by the chief judge.
refused to support her;

Not only has he

he has accused her of ruining a

good man's reputation.
Education and Life Experiences

Education, training or other experience may be
major factors in corruption.

One judge told me there

was substantial disagreement over what is and is not
corrupt behavior.

As a result, citizens test each and

every municipal judge to see what is acceptable.

In

this case, a judge had been approached to "fix" tickets
because other judges do it.
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The judge speculated the difference in ethical
standards may be a generational thing.

Many public

officials entering office today for the first time have
been taught ethical thinking;

they are accustomed to

codes of conduct, canons of behavior, rules of ethics
and so forth.

New officials simply do not think the

same way as someone who entered office two or three
decades ago because they have different training and
experiences.
Closely associated with age is time in public
office.

It has been the experience of one investigator

that an official takes at least two years in office
before he/she is comfortable enough to commit a corrupt
act.

Young, newly elected officials talk about ridding

corruption more than second and third-term incumbents.
More than a few respondents indicated corruption
takes time;

that a corrupt public official isn't

corrupt when he/she enters office.

But over time, the

process of political compromise can change a public
official's thinking;

crimes he/she once thought

intolerable become gray areas, eventually legitimate
practices.

They no longer see right from wrong in the

same manner as ordinary citizens, so they break the law.
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Obstacles and Barriers to Investigation
and Prosecution

Obstacles to investigating public corruption
include time and resources.

Local police departments

spend most of them on service calls and reactive felony
crimes.

The state attorney general's office has but one

general investigator for all state crimes in southern
Nevada except for insurance fraud.
Institutional barriers are also a problem in
investigation.

Public corruption matters have less

appeal for judges, district and U.S. attorneys.
Prosecutors can and do arbitrarily decline cases based
on a lack of "jury and prosecutive appeal."

While

public officials may be said to be held to a higher
standard, one respondent indicated a much higher
standard of proof (beyond all doubt) is required before
prosecutors will go forward with a case of public
corruption.
The same respondent strongly feels that local
politics effects the federal as much as the local
prosecutors office.

Even though the United States

Attorney is an appointed position, the appointment
usually a member of the political community.

According

to the respondent, a recent case involving an close
friend of a Nevada U.S. senator is an example of
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political pressures thwarting investigation at the
federal as well as local levels.
Judges and legislators too have discouraged
investigations of public corruption.

Judges often

recuse themselves not out of conflict of interest, but
because they are afraid of the political consequences if
they authorize nontraditional means (i.e. wiretaps) if a
public official or high profile individual is involved.
Legislators in Nevada prohibit local and state law
enforcement agencies from using wiretaps to investigate
public corruption.5

In fact, Nevada is one of only a

handful of states which prohibits one-party consensually
monitored telephone conversations.6
More recently, in the wake of FBI stings in Arizona
and California, one Nevada state legislator is said to
have warned a group of incoming freshmen to watch out
from whom they took money.

He stressed not that

corruption was illegal, but implied freshmen should
avoid getting caught.
According to one councilman, reelection concerns,
such as attracting campaign contributions and voting
blocks, can lead to corruption justified under the
rubric of "being responsible to the voters."
The same official described campaign disclosure
forms as a joke.

Not only do they fail to provide
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detailed and verifiable information, no agency reviews
them to ensure they are accurate.

The only hazard an

office-holder has to fear is not turning in the forms on
time.

Consequently, elected public officials do not

keep records of campaign contributions.
Another problem with campaign contributions is that
a public official is not required to declare them until
the election race begins even if that does not occur for
years.

In the meantime, the official is free to vote on

issues affecting their contributors.

Moreover, elected

officials are free to do whatever they wish with the
money they receive.

In short, Nevada campaign

contribution laws facilitate and encourage bribery.
A final contributing factor to corruption may be an
abundance laws proscribing certain conduct.
not changed their behavior;

People have

it is just that what used

to be a legitimate practice is now illegal.

If the new

laws were removed, corruption would be less of a problem
because the particular behavior would once again be
legitmate.
Conflicting Policy Goals
Unfortunately I did not develop a question on what
the policy goal of enforcement should be until after I
had already completed some of my initial interviews.
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Yet it is clear there is no unanimous agreement
indicating whether zero tolerance should be the goal.
Of the 19 persons I put the question to, only 13
believed the policy goal of enforcement should be zero
tolerance.

Many of these respondents were adamant that

public officials should be "squeaky clean" avoiding the
very appearance of impropriety.
bit pregnant."

"You can't be a little

Others did not think law enforcement

agencies should be in the business of deciding what
crimes it wants to enforce.
violation;

For them, a violation is a

laws reflect community standards.

If those

standards are outdated, they should be changed by the
legislature, not ignored by authorities.

Furthermore,

right and wrong are important regardless of whether the
public cares about the conduct in question.
In the same vein, public officials swear to uphold
the law, not just part of it, and are bound by their
promise.

Still others worried that allowing public

officials to get away with little corruptions leads to
the erosion of principles over time.
Finally, three respondents arguing for zero
tolerance pointed out that all citizens should be
treated equally by the law as required by the due
process and equal protection clauses of the
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constitution.

Whatever inhibits equal access/protection

results in poor government and public cynicism.
Drawing the Line
Those who argued against zero tolerance were asked
how law enforcement should draw the line as to what
ought to be investigated.

Two of the judges thought it

should depend in part on whether the overall performance
of the public official in question was good for the
community.

If it is, people overlook the "bad stuff."

Another judge and one law enforcement officer
thought if the conduct is not harmful or offensive to
the public, taxpayers' money should not be wasted on it.
According to the officer, the public doesn't care about
one-time bribes.

The federal respondents (and Attorney

General Guidelines) also supported this view when they
indicated the target must have a documented track record
before initiating a UCO.
A district court judge gave the current ticketfixing scandal as an example of judicial corruption
which would not be worth investigative resources.
Instead, voters ought to be allowed to determine whether
the behavior is appropriate conduct in the next
election.
Another district court judge also believed the
question of investigation depended on the nature of the
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office.

Public officials elected on a partisan bases

are supposed to look after the interests of those
constituents who elected them.

While this behavior is

proper for a state legislator, it should be
inappropriate for a judge.
Still another judge thought investigation should
depend on what is in the mind of the public official in
question.

If he/she intends to break the law, he should

be investigated.

But if he accepts money in

appreciation for his support on a particular issue, even
before the event, there is no crime.
Why Corruption is a Small Problem

Most of the respondents believe public corruption
in Las Vegas is a relatively small problem, particularly
when compared with cities back East or in the South.
One reason apparently has to do with size.

Some of the

interviewees suggested local public officials are closer
to their constituents' watchful scrutiny because this
area is still a small community.

In larger, less

closely-knit areas in the East, people are in their
fourth generation of corruption which has become a way
of life.
Several respondents credited "YOBO" and other such
operations carried out across the country for decreasing
(deterring) the level of corruption among elected public
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officials in greater Las Vegas.

One official said the

thought that she may be set up in a UCO by a political
opponent was always in the back of her mind.

To

illustrate the deterrent effect, this respondent cited
the Bob Stupak/Frank Hawkins incident even though Stupak
was not acting with law enforcement.

The point is he

could have been.
Other reasons for a decrease in the level of public
corruption over the past two decades include greater
public awareness and less tolerance;

greater media

investigative reporting of public officials and their
families;

increased professionalization and training of

elected officials and appointees;
campaign contributions;

reporting laws for

and cable television's coverage

of legislatures such as CSPAN and channel 31 which
(ostensibly) allow people to see the inner workings of
government.
Where is Corruption?
The growth of gaming, real estate development and
other aspects of the economy was also described as
fostering increased corruption.

Several respondents

believe corruption will be centered around large money
issues riding on the decisions of a particular public
official.

Thus, zoning officials, building inspectors

and the like are more prone to corruption.

Following
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the same logic, another public official thought
corruption was more likely at higher levels of
government such as the county commission and state
legislature where the dollar amounts are higher.
One mayor, councilman and law enforcement officer
thought judges were more likely to be corrupt.

To

paraphrase the mayor, judges have god-like power in the
courtroom with no checks and balances, no
accountability.

For example, there is a local judge who

continually abuses his discretionary authority.

The

judge routinely dismisses cases where traffic officers
have issued citations for failure to have driving
insurance.

The judge does not believe in the law

because insurance companies make too much money so he
refuses to enforce it.

He also dismisses citations

issued to persons over the age of 62 because he does not
believe officers should be citing senior citizens.
Yet the judge goes even further.

He regularly

dismisses cases against persons cited for driving under
the influence of intoxicants (DUIs) if they give a
donation to various charities such as Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (MADD). When election time rolls around,
this judge has an army of charity organizers pounding
the streets in his support.
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One respondent also revealed a local judge uses
his/her marshals to collect campaign contributions in
the area.

Moreover, he/she threatened the wife of a

local leader of the Black community with arrest unless
she allowed one of his/her reelection signs to be placed
in her yard.
Two judges thought it more likely law enforcement
agencies would be prone to corruption.

One judge

referred to a cop-mentality in which some police
officers refuse to apply the laws to themselves.

A law

enforcement respondent reinforced this view saying
police are naturally skeptical of others, but when it
comes to their own they sometimes cannot see corruption
for what it is.
The second judge thought the potential monetary
gain in "ripping-off11 drug dealers made police
corruption inevitable (note that four North Las Vegas
Police officers had just been arrested on drug related
charges).

In each situation, the respondents felt these

office-holders were accountable to no one.7
On the issue of police corruption, one North Las
Vegas respondent pointed out that the local police union
is very strong.

Not only does it make substantial

campaign contributions;

through it, the police chief
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and his assistant are able to manipulate the mayor and
city council for their own political ends.
Moreover, the two are able to protect their
political friends and supporters.

For example, one

councilman beat his wife and girlfriend.

In the ensuing

investigation, the police deliberately lost the
paperwork and evidence so that the councilman could get
away with the abuse.

Another councilman was allowed to

regularly extort campaign contributions from local
businesses.
One judge charged that the FBI and district
attorney used clandestine investigative techniques to
obtain harmful information which they use to blackmail
local public officials.

He/she has observed the

district attorney use such information to prevent
persons from running for political office.
A county commissioner, together with a city
councilman, believe corruption in the Las Vegas area to
be most likely at the bureaucratic level.

In the first

case, the respondent indicated this was because
commissioners are only part-time officials making them
heavily reliant on the research and recommendations of
their staffs.
The second respondent believed elected officials in
a small community were subject to closer voter scrutiny.
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The larger the community, the greater opportunity for
corruption on the part of elected officials who are not
as close to their constituents.
The Media

Table 3 describes the responses regarding the
media's treatment of public corruption.

It shows many

Table 3. Media Coverage of Public
Corruption in Las Vegas

Respondents

Coverage Overplays/ Accurate
Biased Underplays Report

Total

Male
Female

3
2

7
3

5
2

15
7

Age 47 or less
Age 48 or more

3
2

3
7

4
3

10
12

Democrat
Republican

3
2

7
3

4
3

14
8

Minority

1

1

1

3

16(-) service
18(+) service

3
2

4
6

3
4

10
12

Judges

1

5

4

10

Commissioner/
Councilman/
Mayor

2

3

1

6

Prosecutor/
Law Enforcement

2

2

2

6

26

51

36

113

Total

Note: Two of the respondents had no opinion regarding
media coverage of public corruption.
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respondents, particularly men and Democrats, are highly
critical of the media.

It should be noted that two

respondents had no perception of how the media treated
corruption.
The majority of respondents believe the media is a
competitive business with its own political agenda;

it

is not impartial and has a preoccupation with reporting
bad news for the sake of selling newspapers and air
time.
Eight public officials said outright the general
media overplays corruption.

Additionally, five others

thought the media based its decision to overplay or
underplay on its relationship with the alleged corrupt
official.

If a particular relationship is friendly or

involves business (i.e. advertising or source
information), the press tends to play down questionable
ethics or outright corruption.
For example, one elected respondent had serious
problems with the way in which the media deals with
Mayor Jan Laverty Jones' trips out of town to promote
the image of Las Vegas.

Jones approaches various

businesses (notably Steve Wynn) in the community to
obtain travel funds for herself.

She justifies

soliciting the money on the ground that the city cannot
afford to send her to all of the places she wants to go.
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At least two problems arise when a seated public
official asks for money from the private sector for
official business.

A private business may fear that if

it fails to deliver the money, it will suffer the wrath
of the person in office.

Citizens rightly or wrongly

believe public officials have enormous retaliatory power
they can bring to bear to the detriment of an
individual.

Alternatively, a company may expect

favorable treatment the next time one of its issues is
up for a vote.
This particular official believes Jones' conduct is
not only unethical, but should be made illegal.

If it

were any public servant but Jones, the media would
crucify him.

But Fletcher Jones is the number one

advertiser in the Las Vegas Valley.

Media businesses do

not want to lose that advertising money so they hold
their tongues.
Another example given was the case of a municipal
judge widely suspected of being corrupt.

The Sun will

not report the alleged corruption because Brian
Greenspun is an alternate judge for that court.
The Sun was criticized from another quarter.
According to this person, organized crime figure
Benjamin "Bugsy" Sigel had the newspaper established
with a generous loan from the Mafia-dominated Teamsters
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Union.

Its primary task was to improve Sigel's image

through a public relations campaign.

The newspaper's

original connection to criminal elements made a
permanent impact on its reporting.
Several respondents indicated the media makes some
actions appear corrupt when they are nothing of the
sort.

The media makes accusations and innuendos without

proof and will not retract them when they are shown to
be untrue.

It misrepresents or exaggerates these

situations either to sell newspapers or to

influence

voter attitudes against a public

official. According to

two respondents, the land "scam"

involving Ron Lurieand

Ashley Hall is a case in point.

The media made the

"secret" land deal appear corrupt when it was neither
secret, illegal nor unethical.
One respondent used himself as an example of media
bias.

During his first bid for county commissioner, the

R-J ran a series of false reports alleging the
official's conduct was corrupt in order to ensure that
another candidate would get the job.

It was bad enough

the first time; however, after it became known the
official was considering running for the office a second
time, he received warnings such stories would be ran
again.
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Television media seeks sound-bytes which do not
give the whole story.

These bytes of information are

often taken out of context to convey whatever story they
want their audience to believe.

Television journalists

will not cover a story unless they can get film footage.
Moreover, they will not play it hard unless they are
granted exclusive access.
Newspapers often are neither more detailed nor more
accurate.

One judge indicated he/she frequently reads

of cases tried in his/her court and wonders whether they
are the same ones.

Telling the whole story doesn't sell

newspapers, so they report only those parts which sell.
Other respondents as well complained the press is too
lazy to get the true facts prior to publicizing a story.
They merely accept information given to them.
Nevertheless, the respondents were not unanimous in
their opinions of the media.

Two officials thought the

media was doing a pretty fair job of reporting public
corruption matters.

Others thought the media had a role

in exposing and coping with public corruption in our
community.
In the post-Watergate era, there has been a
tendency for every journalist to want to be an
investigative reporter.

The effect has been to greatly

enhance the exposure of public corruption.

One judge

121
was adamant that the media's investigation of public
corruption was more efficient and vital than federal law
enforcement because of the latter's bureaucracy.8
The vast majority of respondents abhorred leaks to
the media regarding investigations.

Some faulted the

media for encouraging and publishing such revelations
regardless of its accuracy.

Others faulted law

enforcement agencies, grand juries and the courts saying
the media should publish whatever information it deems
accurate regardless of the source.9
The Oath
Regrettably, the oath of office appears to have
little meaning, impact or significance for public
officials and the general public.
the officials' views.

Table 4 breaks down

Interestingly, this is one

instance where women differed markedly from men.

Seven

of the eight women thought the oath either impacted all
public officials or that the impact varied among them.
Those who thought the impact varied often compared it
with marital vows saying some people stick by them, some
do not.

Democrats too were more likely to find the oath

significant than Republicans.
For those who thought the oath had an impact, some
thought it created a promise either to themselves or the
public which helped build their characters.

Two

122
believed the oath symbolically reinforced the importance
of what sworn officials do and why they are in office.
Two others thought the oath set standards of conduct for
public officials to avoid even the appearance of
impropriety, let alone illegality.

More than one said

the oath should be emphasized more often and suggested
the media could play a role here.
Table 4. impact of Oath of Office
on Local Public Officials

Respondents

Definite
Impact

Impact Varies
On Official

Total
No
Impact

Male
Female

4
3

1
4

11
1

16
8

Age 47 or less
Age 48 or more

4
3

1
4

7
5

12
12

Democrat
Republican
Nonpartisan

4
3
0

5
0
0

5
6
1

14
9
1

Minority

2

1

2

5

16(-) years service
18(+) years service

5
2

2
3

5
7

12
12

Judges

2

2

6

10

Commissioner/
Councilman/
Mayor

2

3

2

7

Prosecutor/
Law Enforcement

3

0

4

7

37

26

62

125

Total
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Half of the respondents believe the oath is taken
strictly for reasons of tradition;

it is part of the

theater and pomp or a requirement a public official must
meet in order to get the job;
doing business;

it is a condition of

it makes the oath-taker feel good when

he says the words.

A councilman, who keeps the oath on

his/her wall, speculated the vast majority of public
officials know nothing of the oath beyond the words
"Repeat after me."
To illustrate its lack of significance, one
respondent complained that in the recent inaugural
festivities, Hillary Rodham-Clinton's clothing drew
more media coverage than the oath.

Another pointed out

that no public official locally has ever been tried
under perjury statutes for violating the oath of office
even though he could be.
Only a handful of respondents thought the oath had
any significance to the public.

When it did, it was

usually after some event when a constituent would point
out "you're sworn to do this."

Most officials believe

the public is unaware and unconcerned with who takes an
oath prior to entering office.

As an example, the son

of one respondent recently became mayor of a small
community.

Not one citizen showed up for the swearing-

in ceremonies.

Distinguishing the Good from the Bad
I was interested in finding out whether any
officials thought that breaking one law to enforce
another eroded the distinction in their minds between
the good guys and bad.
persons interviewed.

Table 5 reveals the views of the
Three respondents see no

difference between a UCA who offers a bribe (or buys
Table 5. Breaking Laws to Enforce Laws Erodes
Distinction Between Police and Criminals
Yes

No

Male
Female

1
2

15
6

16
8

Age 47 or less
Age 48 or more

3
0

9
12

12
12

Democrat
Republican
Nonpartisan

2
0
1

12
9
0

14
9
1

Minority

2

3

5

16(-) years service
18(+) years service

3
0

9
12

12
12

Judges

1

9

10

Commissioner/
Councilman/
Mayor

2

5

7

Prosecutor/
Law Enforcement

0

7

7

17

108

125

Respondents

Total

Total
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drugs) or any other citizen.

For these individuals,

UCAs are committing crimes even though their motivations
are different.
by example.

One thought the government should lead

Interestingly, only one of these

individuals thought UCOs should not be used.
Yet none of these respondents went on to suggest
UCAs should be prosecuted.

Moreover, one of the three

agreed federal authorities should be using UCOs in
public corruption investigations.

And the one who

disagreed with their use nevertheless thought "YOBO" was
good for the community!
Others saw a distinction so long as the UCA abided
by guidelines, the advice of the prosecuting attorney
and did not become the criminal character he portrayed.
The vast majority believed the public supports
undercover officers even when they break the law so long
as they perceive the behavior as a reasonable means to
an end.

As one judge indicated, Dirty Harry often

breaks the rules, but he's very popular.

UCOs are seen

as "a legitimate means to a legitimate end.”
Purposes of Undercover Operations
For most of the respondents, the purpose of
undercover investigations of public corruption is to
expose such corruption to the public, obtain evidence of
the crime by the only sufficient means possible, and
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restore integrity and confidence to political
institutions.

Others claim UCOs demonstrate to the

citizenry that public officials are not above the law
and can be held accountable for their criminal misdeeds.
Still others believe UCOs deter would-be violators.
official put it this way:

One

if a public official can't be

honest for the right reasons, he can be compelled out of
fear he will be caught should he decide to commit a
crime.
The federal prosecutor, who has conducted
considerable research into public corruption
investigations, claimed it is not possible to obtain
sufficient evidence to prosecute an historical case with
traditional investigative techniques.

A jury will not

be persuaded of corruption unless its members can see,
hear and judge for themselves the behavior in question.
Even in the unlikely event witnesses were available and
willing to testify, a jury would not accept their
testimony.

At the time he conducted his research, every

single Hobbes Act (extortion under the color of official
right) conviction was obtained via UCOs.
For some offices (such as judges), UCOs are the
only check on government power according to one
respondent.

Another reason given is that such

operations protect the public from harm caused by
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corrupt public officials which, unlike most crimes,
affect each and every citizen.
Dangers of Undercover Operations

Entrapping the innocent and naive, as well as
overzealousness on the part of law enforcement agents,
were the two main dangers of UCOs described by the
respondents.

Some are concerned investigating agents

may have an irrational preconceived notion that a
particular official is corrupt which is not supported by
the evidence.

They gave the examples described below.

One respondent described former commissioner
Woodrow Wilson, a "YOBO" target, as a politically naive
public servant looking out for the interests of his
constituents.

Two other officials thought "YOBO" target

Jack Pettiti, a former county commissioner, also was not
corrupt.

Additionally, one of the latter two thought

"YOBO” target Eugene Echols was not corrupt, but
entrapped.

All three of these respondents were in

public office at the time of the investigation.
The next most cited danger was leaks to the press
which damage a public official's reputation regardless
of whether corruption is ever proven in a court of law.
Law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, grand juries and
the courts justify the leaks because they believe a
target is corrupt, but just cannot prove it.
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Alternatively, they leak information intending to ruin a
target politically;
futures;

to bolster their own political

or because they want to give the "scoop" to

their friends in the media.

Sometimes information is

inadvertently leaked when one person says something to
his/her spouse who then passes it on.
Other concerns included overhearing/disclosing
non-criminal personal information;

insufficient

investigation into gray areas prior to bringing forth
public allegations;

and creating crime where none had

been demonstrated before.

The latter was not viewed so

much as entrapment as inappropriate government behavior
(i.e. there's enough crime out there already).
Most believe the targets of UCOs have been those
public officials who have abused their power and
committed criminal acts.

One respondent observed

targets in YOBO appeared to be long-term office holders
who have had greater opportunities to commit corrupt
acts.
Yet another official had no idea what targeting
criteria was used by law enforcement agencies other than
directing such operations against political opponents.
According to this judge, there would be less abuse of
UCOs by federal agencies if the targeting criteria were
better known and subject to public input.
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The issue of UCOs as political weapons was one I
asked respondents to address specifically.

With one

exception, respondents did not feel UCOs were directed
at any political group, party or issues.

That person

thought UCOs were unfairly targeted at African-American
political leaders during the Reagan/Bush years.
Nevertheless, as Table 6 reveals, six respondents
thought UCOs in Las Vegas have been targeted at
Table 6. Undercover Operations
Used As Political Weapons

Respondents

Yes

Possible

No

Total

Male
Female

4
2

4
5

8
1

16
8

Age 47 or less
Age 48 or more

4
2

4
5

4
5

12
12

Democrat
Republican
Nonpartisan

3
2
1

7
2
0

4
5
0

14
9
1

Minority

2

2

1

5

16(-) years service
18(+) years service

4
2

4
5

4
5

12
12

Judges

4

1

5

10

Commissioner/
Councilman/
Mayor

2

4

1

7

Prosecutor/
Law Enforcement

0

4

3

7

32

47

46

125

Total
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political opponents and nine more believed such
targeting was possible.
of note:

The table suggests two things

Democrats are more likely to see such

operations as political weapons;

and half of the law

enforcement respondents think using UCOs as political
weapons in Las Vegas is possible.
A commissioner believed former commissioner Manny
Cortez was the political target of the FBI.

A judge was

absolutely convinced the FBI investigated former federal
judge Harry Claiborne not because he was corrupt, but
because he spoke out against the Organized Crime Strike
Force of Las Vegas.

Another judge is of the opinion law

enforcement and prosecutors at all levels will try to
smear attorney Oscar Goodman's campaign should he decide
to run for the office of Lieutenant Governor.
Surprisingly, there was no unanimous agreement as
to whether law enforcement agencies should be
arbitrarily testing the integrity of public officials.
Two of the respondents, both judges, thought law
enforcement agencies should be testing the integrity of
public officials.

Neither thought there was any harm in

asking an official to take a bribe pointing out that
merely asking a person to commit a crime is not
entrapment.

A policy of testing would keep public

officials on notice their behavior is possibly being
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scrutinized making them think twice before committing a
crime.
Yet the rest of the respondents opposed testing for
several reasons.

A UCA should have some reasonable

grounds for breaking one law to enforce another;
are expensive;

UCOs

UCOs can undermine political careers and

public confidence;

testing is also likely to cause a

feud between law enforcement agencies and other public
officials which is not in the interest of the public;
finally, such testing is characteristic of police
states.
Who Should Conduct Undercover Operations?

Table 7 describes the level of government which
ought to conduct undercover investigations of public
corruption.

Ten respondents thought public corruption

undercover investigations should be conducted
exclusively by federal agencies.10

The remainder would

include other levels of police.
Respondents put forward the following arguments for
why UCOs should be conducted by all three law
enforcement levels:

to give each level the opportunity

to clean its own house;
resources;

to share intelligence and

and to allow federal agencies to oversee

local public corruption investigations in a task force
setting.

Several thought public corruption investigations
should be conducted by the same level of government
against which they are targeted.

In other words, local

police agencies should investigate local corruption;
state agencies should investigate the state;

federal

agencies should investigate federal matters involving
Table 7. Which Law Enforcement Agencies Should
Conduct Undercover Operations

Respondents

Federal Agencies
Only

All Levels of
Government

Total

Male
Female

6
4

10
4

16
8

Age 47 or less
Age 48 or more

4
6

8
6

12
12

Democrat
Republican
Nonpartisan

7
3
0

7
6
1

14
9
1

Minority

0

5

5

16(-) years service
18(+) years service

5
5

7
7

12
12

Judges

3

7

10

Commissioner/
Councilman/
Mayor

4

3

7

Prosecutor/
Law Enforcement

3

4

7

50

75

125

Total
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interstate corruption, federal targets, matters of
national interest, and, according to one respondent,
corruption within state and local police departments;
and/or only when corruption is widespread beyond the
resources or willingness of local and state authorities
to do something about it.
Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of
respondents agree or strongly agree federal agencies
should be using UCOs in investigating allegations of
public corruption.
the use of UCOs.

One official outright disagrees with
Two other persons, including one law

enforcement officer, would limit such investigations to
matters involving federal targets.
Several arguments were given for allowing only
federal agencies to investigate public corruption
matters.

Several respondents, including the district

attorney, hold that federal agencies are not as
susceptible to local political pressures or electoral
concerns.

The district attorney's office and LVMPD come

under heavy fire for wasting resources if they dedicate
them to long-term investigations.

If those

investigations fail to produce substantial results, the
heads of those agencies lose their bids for re-election.
One respondent cited the local Wynn-Mushkin
investigation as an abuse of police power and waste of
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resources targeted at "public people."

The threat of

voter retribution is an interesting question.

According

to the federal prosecutor, adverse campaign publicity is
not an issue at the federal level.
Another concern often expressed is that local and
state investigators/prosecutors have close friendships
with other local/state public officials because they
grew up here.

These close relationships can prevent

investigators/prosecutors from looking objectively at a
questionable situation.
Close relationships also mean there is greater risk
the investigation will be leaked or biased.

One judge

believes local police and other public officials try to
cover up for their friends if the investigation is
conducted by state or local agencies.

But they are

afraid to intervene in an FBI investigation.

According

to this judge, there would be no justice if
investigations were left to state and local agencies.
Another elected respondent has seen this firsthand.
He/she brought evidence of corruption to the district
attorney which was subsequently "swept under the carpet"
because of political friendships and ties.

He/she then

turned to the FBI which was ready to investigate the
matter.

Still another respondent was confident that if

he/she were the target of an investigation, he/she
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should would be alerted by friends in law enforcement
within minutes.
Several people also pointed out the sheriff, being
an elected official, has close political ties to other
local and state politicians.

This ties LVMPD to the

wishes and futures of certain local officials and
political allies.

According to two law enforcement

respondents, any undercover officer who damaged the
sheriff's political connections would jeopardize his
future assignments.
Another official advised some police officers in
LVMPD's intelligence division (charged with
investigating public corruption) to make substantial
campaign contributions to the winner of the sheriff's
race (even if they have to borrow the money from a bank)
in order to ensure they keep their plain clothes jobs
and overtime.

They are indebted to the sheriff for

their positions and subject to his direction which may
be politically motivated.
Even if the police chief is an appointed position,
as in Henderson and North Las Vegas, some respondents
believe it is neither wise nor fair to ask police to
investigate their employers.

Fear of reprisal is a very

real concern, even at the state level.

One official

pointed out that the Georgia Attorney General's office
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did not receive a pay raise for several years because of
a public corruption investigation it had conducted of
the state legislature.
There are other problems associated with local
police UCOs in public corruption matters.

An undercover

police officer is likely to be recognized by targeted
public officials in communities as small as the three
cities making it impossible to maintain his cover.
the state agencies would have this problem.

Even

The federal

agencies, on the other hand, have a much larger pool to
draw from across the country.
Finally some of the respondents were concerned that
state and local police agencies do not operate under the
same stringent guidelines as federal agencies nor do
they have the training and supervision.

For example,

local/state police do not have to obtain headquarters
approval for practically every action in a public
corruption investigation as does the local FBI office.
Controls
Table 8 shows that public officials solidly reject
external controls over police undercover investigations.
Given the number of respondents concerned with UCOs as
political weapons, this finding surprised me.

One of

the five favoring external controls, a law enforcement
officer, believed the only outside supervising official
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should be the prosecuting attorney to ensure the
operation remains legal and avoids entrapment.

All

other law enforcement officers rejected judicial or
citizens committee approval of law enforcement
investigations.

Others opposed external controls

because they entail more people being aware of the
investigation and thus a greater chance information will
be leaked to the press.
Table 8. External Controls Should Be Used
For Undercover Operations

Respondents

Yes

No

Male
Female

2
3

14
5

16
8

Age 47 or less
Age 48 or more

2
3

10
9

12
12

Democrat
Republican
Nonpartisan

3
2
0

11
7
1

14
9
1

Minority

2

3

5

16(—) years service
18(+) years service

2
3

10
9

12
12

Judges

2

8

10

Commissioner/
Councilman/
Mayor

2

5

7

Prosecutor/
Law Enforcement

1

6

7

27

98

125

Total

Total
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Two advocates of external controls argued an
independent panel of people possessing diverse
backgrounds, such as a grand jury or citizens committee,
could ensure the investigation was properly motivated
and predicated on facts.

This would obviate the problem

of political manipulation and vendetta.

It would also

provide a check on the use of government power.

As

indicated earlier, one particular respondent gave
LVMPD7s recent Mushkin case as an example of an
investigation taken for illegitimate political reasons.
Another public official thought that if legislators
had oversight responsibilities, they could prove helpful
in conducting the investigation.

The same official,

however, worried this situation might also lead to leaks
and tip-offs.
Those opposing judicial approval/direction of UCOs
suggested the proper role of the judiciary is to review
the investigation, not participate in it.

The latter

would have the effect of eroding the separation of
powers between branches of government.

Moreover, if

judges were involved in an investigation, it is likely
to prejudice the subsequent judicial review process.
Most of those adverse to external controls didn't
like citizens committees at all.

Citizens committees,

like the judiciary, lack the time, resources and
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competence to either participate in or oversee
traditional police investigations, let alone complex
undercover investigations of public corruption.

One

respondent thought the citizens committee was better
suited for investigating and reviewing allegations of
police misconduct.

Another thought the media provides a

sufficient external check on UCOs.
Public officials made several recommendations to
ensure UCOs were not used as political weapons.

First,

a target should have a documented history of
predisposition, based on credible sources of
information, which suggests an ongoing pattern of
violating public corruption statutes.

There should be

no "trolling" or "fishing expeditions" for corrupt
public officials because such officials are not readily
identifiable.

Unlike prostitutes and drug dealers,

corrupt public officials do not exhibit profile
characteristics which can easily be targeted.
Second, the nature of the temptation should be
reasonable and commensurate with the crime.

One

investigator told me the general rule of thumb is that
the UCA shouldn't appear to be more of a criminal than
the target.

Accordingly, he should avoid unnecessary

criminal activity and outrageous enticements.
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Third, UCOs should be conducted according to
written standard operating procedures and guidelines.
They should further meet the stated goals of a law
enforcement agency's elected political head.

As one

respondent said, the head of a law enforcement agency
independent of all political controls is close to being
king and this is not desirable.
Fourth, care should be taken that the public is not
unduly harmed or at risk.

Fifth, the investigation

should be narrowly focused on specific violations.
Ambiguous phrasing of questions subject to
interpretation allows the government to frame public
officials and should be avoided to the maximum extent
possible.
Sixth, some respondents believe UCOs should only be
used when traditional investigative means have exhausted
and failed to obtain evidence sufficient for
prosecution.

Others prefer UCOs at the outset because

they are less likely to be leaked to the media and
therefore less likely to cause scandal unsupported by
facts.
Seventh, a UCO should yield evidence of an ongoing
pattern of corruption.

This accomplishes two things:

one, it clarifies intent on the part of the target
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public official;

two, it denies the defense attorney

the claim of a one-time sin.
Eighth, several respondents were concerned law
enforcement agents, particularly federal agents, may
overzealously pursue a particular individual just
because they think he's corrupt.

As a general rule of

thumb, UCAs should take their best shot at the target
and stop;

if corruption isn't there, then it isn't;

don't endlessly pursue the matter.
Other suggestions were as follows:

UCAs should be

the brightest, most well-trained officers of the law.
the UCA's chain of command should be briefed daily on
what is going on in the UCO.

UCAs and their supervisors

should be held liable for their conduct in criminal and
civil court.

A UCA should not be left in his role so

long he is at risk of assimilating the character he
portrays.

UCAs should be careful to abide by the law,

guidelines and constitutional requirements;

since UCOs

are likely to involve violation of certain laws, there
should be some compelling reason for the government to
break the law.

Finally, UCOs should be revealed only

through public indictments (no leaks to the press).
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Chapter Notes
1. Other respondents thought while there is little
corruption, there is quite a bit of questionable ethics.
2. Interestingly, this respondent saw the latter as an
ethical problem more than the crime of obstruction of
justice.
3. This may be true of Las Vegas. However, other
industries such as mining contribute substantially more
money to campaigns at the state level than
telemarketing.
4. Ironically, many times informants in public
corruption cases are colleagues whom the target has
approached for assistance.
5. Chapter 179.460 Nevada Revised Statutes (1992)
reveals wiretaps are authorized in bribery and extortion
matters. However, according to a local deputy district
attorney, the statute is interpreted narrowly to exclude
instances where the person offering the bribe is a UCA.
6. One-party consensual calls are those in which one of
the participants in the telephone conversation willingly
allows the call to be recorded.
7. According to one judge, this situation is made worse
at the federal level where law enforcement agencies have
unlimited resources.
8. Another judge thought local media had limited
resources for investigative reporting, but instead
relied on informants within law enforcement agencies,
prosecutors offices and the courts.
9. Interestingly, one official thought by leaking
information to the press, law enforcement agencies were
merely providing valuable information to the public.
Such disclosure he argued is good for the community
because it further deters would-be violators.
10. Only one of the comparison criteria indicated
whether a public official will believe such operations
should be conducted exclusively by federal agencies;
all five minorities thought such operations should be
conducted by all three levels of law enforcement
agencies.

CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
A clean city...requires at least two things— active
law enforcement and elected officials who oppose
organized crime (Gardiner 1970, 172).
Social contract theory requires substantial
consensus on moral values, the state of nature and the
proper role of government (Kammen 1986) .

In order to be

justified, seventy-five percent of the respondents had
to agree that federal agencies should use UCOs to
investigate public corruption allegations.

My research

demonstrated that an overwhelming ninety-six percent of
the respondents believe such investigations ought to be
conducted in public corruption matters under certain
conditions outlined in Chapter 5.

Eighty percent of the

respondents believe the federal agencies should direct
those operations at the state and local levels of
government.
Several questions were raised in this study which
are worthy of further inquiry.

For example, Democrats

seem to be more likely to believe UCOs are used as
political weapons.

This issue would lend itself to

comparative analysis.
Federal respondents perceived corruption to be a
far greater problem than other officials.

It would be

interesting to see if this were a trend among various
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levels of public officials across the country.

This

could be studied through a survey questionnaire.
Other questions include who have been the targets
of public corruption probes?

Are they long-term

officeholders as one respondent suggested?

Are new,

young officials less likely to be corrupt than older
incumbents?

If so, does this result from education,

training, position or experience?

Are federal agencies

as divorced from local politics as some respondents
think them to be?

Where state and local law enforcement

agencies have conducted undercover investigations of
public corruption, did voters retaliate for cases
yielding no indictments or resulting' in unsuccessful
prosecutions?

Did the legislatures, judiciary or media

retaliate by changing laws, reducing budgets or publicly
attacking investigative agencies?

Do all four groups

react similarly across the nation?
Here in Nevada, it would be an interesting endeavor
just to try to identify the good-old-boy network.
may not be so difficult as it seems.

This

One could use

Thomas Dye's (1990) criteria for identifying the local
and institutional elite structure today and compare it
with a generation ago.

One might also do some research

as to whether the narrow industry base of Nevada fosters
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greater corruption than areas with diversified
industries.
Local respondents made an argument that corruption
in Las Vegas today is substantially less than it was ten
or twenty years ago.
support of this view.

I would add one other indicator in
Some studies have shown public

corruption to be positively correlated to organized
crime when the latter is present (Gardiner 1970).

If

those are true, it should be noted that the influence of
organized crime in Las Vegas has diminished appreciably
over the past decade.
If public corruption has decreased, it nevertheless
is still present in our community, according to many of
the respondents.

In a sense, the lack of consensus on

the nature of corruption disturbs me.

It seems public

officials, particularly judges, not only disagree on
what conduct is corrupt, but what illegal corruption is
worthy of investigation by any law enforcement agency,
let alone at the federal level.
Varying perceptions among public officials of what
behavior is corrupt opens the door for arbitrary
treatment throughout the criminal justice process.

It

is clearly possible that the same corrupt act will be
treated differently by various agencies, prosecutors and
courts.

The result would be, perhaps is, unequal
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treatment under the law which goes against the grain of
social contract theory as I understand it.
If I could fall back onto Hobbes, perhaps the lack
of consensus may be explained by suggesting that some of
my respondents do not know what is in the true interests
of themselves and our community.

I am not presumptuous

enough to claim I know the answers or to tell another
official his/her duties.

However, it seems to me there

is a need for discussion, debate and education on the
nature of corruption in our community and what ought to
be done about it if only so that we can ensure every
person is treated in the same manner.

If there had been

such a discussion among my respondents, I am confident
that in the end, all of them would have supported the
use of federal UCOs in public corruption matters.
Perhaps a policy of zero tolerance is neither
feasible nor desirable.

Trying to eradicate all public

corruption would require an enormous police/regulatory
bureaucracy which would itself become corrupt and
cumbersome.

In fact, much of government red tape today

derives from previous efforts to thwart public
corruption (Klitgaard 1988).
Yet it is difficult for me to accept public
officials overlooking corrupt acts if the particular
offender is otherwise good for the community;

or that
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they should arbitrarily decide what laws should and
should not be enforced.

When a law enforcement officer

tells me a $5,000 bribe is sometimes okay;

or when a

judge suggests he/she is willing to go to prison for
money, it shakes my faith in government, even humanity.

Appendix
Interview Questionnaire
At the beginning of the interview, I will state the
general purpose of my questions and go over the
definitions described below so that we are on the same
sheet of music.

I will also obtain the following

biographical data:
Race
Sex
Age
Occupation
Education— institution and degree obtained
Party affiliation
Class
The scope of public official is limited to
officials who swear an oath before taking office and
would therefore include law enforcement officers.
An undercover agent is defined as a police officer
who, in an undercover capacity, infiltrates a group
and/or conspiracy for the purpose of obtaining
information about a crime (i.e. public corruption);

it

is not an informant.
Corruption (of public officials) is that behavior
proscribed by law (e.g. accepting bribes, kickbacks,
extortion, etc.).

While the scope could easily be
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expanded to include any instance where there is an
apparent conflict of interest or ethical problem, not
all such cases could or should be investigated under
criminal law.
1. Law enforcement agencies have conducted several
highly publicized undercover investigations of public
corruption, the most notable of which was probably
ABSCAM. In your opinion, what has been the purposes of
these undercover investigations? Do these purposes
conform with what citizens expect law enforcement
agencies to be doing? Why or why not?
2. In your opinion, should
regarding public corruption
there corrupt acts which do
of investigative resources,
etc.? Why or why not?

the enforcement goal
be "zero tolerance" or are
not warrant the expenditure
meet community standards,

3. The nature and extent of public corruption is
indicated by such things as the number of citizen
complaints, the amount of media reports and the
resources dedicated to coping with the problem. Based
on your perception, how would you describe public
corruption in our community?
4. Undercover operations (UCOs) in investigations of
public corruption have stimulated substantial legal,
moral and political debate. What do you see as the
potential dangers involved when UCOs are used to
investigate allegations of public corruption?
5. Does the fact that an undercover agent (UCA) breaks
a law to enforce another erode distinction you see
between the agent and the bad guy? e.g. the UCA
violates the law when he offers a bribe to a public
official.
6. Relatively few public servants are required to swear
an oath prior to accepting a position in government.
From your perspective, what is the significance and
impact of the oath of office on public officials?
Does
it effect the way citizens view those officials?
7. Explain whether you believe undercover
investigations of public corruption should be conducted
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by state, local or federal law enforcement agencies or
all three.
8. Allegations and investigations of any type
substantially impact the careers of public officials and
the attitudes of citizens toward their government.
Please compare traditional investigative techniques
(e.g. interviews, subpoenas, search warrants, etc.) with
undercover methods. Which type of investigation is
likely to be more harmful to the public official? The
political process?
9. Police inevitably have substantial discretion in the
conduct of their investigations. From your perspective,
what kinds of constraints and limitations should be
placed on undercover work to ensure it promotes the
public good?
10. Should UCOs be controlled within the agency or be
subject to external controls such as approval by
judiciary or citizen committee?
11. Some argue that there is no difference between
police beating information out of a subject and tricking
him out of it using an undercover operation. In terms
of enforcing the law, what differences, if any, do you
see between beating and tricking?
12. Some have argued that a public official's behavior
is determined largely by environmental factors (e.g.
special interest groups or a skillful, a manipulative
undercover agent). Others argue that as human beings,
public officials have the innate capacity to control
their own behavior and freely choose whether or not to
commit a corrupt act. Which view in your mind more
accurately describes the nature of public officials in
our community and what are its ramifications for
undercover work?
13. Federal agencies should be using undercover
operations in investigating matters of alleged public
corruption in the greater Las Vegas area.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Strongly Agree
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